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Abstract: This Article responds to an appa-
rent gap in the scholarly literature which 
fails to merge the fields of human rights 
law and international criminal law—a step 
that would resolve the current debate as to 
whether any amnesty in transitional justi-
ce settings is lawful. More specifically, even 
though both fields are a subset of transitio-
nal justice in general, the discipline of in-
ternational criminal law still supports the 
theory of “qualified amnesties” in transi-
tional justice schemes, while international 
human rights law now stands for the pro-
position that no amnesty is lawful in tho-
se settings. This Article brings attention to 
this new development through a discussion 
of the Barrios Altos case. This Article seeks 
to reveal how an international human rights 
decision can dramatically impact state prac-
tice, thus also contributing to a pending 
question in international human rights law 
as to whether such jurisprudence is effecti-
ve in increasing human rights protections. 
The Article concludes by looking at the im-
plications of this new legal development in 
regard to amnesties in order to encourage 
future research regarding the role of crimi-
nal justice in transitional justice schemes.
Keywords: Amnesty in the Americas. Tran-
sitional Justice. Human Rights Violations.
Resumo: Este artigo responde a uma apa-
rente lacuna na literatura acadêmica que 
falha em mesclar os campos do direito cri-
minal internacional e dos direitos humanos 
— um passo que iria resolver o atual debate 
sobre se a anistia em contextos de justiça de 
transição é legítima. Mais especificamente, 
apesar de ambos os campos serem um sub-
conjunto da justiça de transição em geral, a 
disciplina de direito penal internacional ain-
da apoia a teoria das “anistias  qualificadas” 
em sistemas de justiça de transição, enquan-
to o direito internacional dos direitos hu-
manos agora está para a proposição de que 
a anistia não é legítima nesses contextos. 
Este artigo chama a atenção para este novo 
desenvolvimento através de uma discussão 
do caso Barrios Altos. Este artigo procura re-
velar como uma decisão internacional dos 
direitos humanos pode afetar drasticamen-
te a prática do Estado, contribuindo assim 
para uma questão pendente no direito in-
ternacional de direitos humanos que é saber 
se tal jurisprudência é eficaz para ampliar 
a proteção dos direitos humanos. O artigo 
conclui olhando para esta nova evolução ju-
rídica a respeito das anistias para incentivar 
futuras pesquisas sobre o papel da justiça 
penal em esquemas de justiça de transição.
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1 Introduction
Until recently, immunity measures like amnesties were considered an accep-
table part of promoting transitional justice in countries seeking to address past 
episodes of systematic violations of human rights. The politically sensitive need to 
broker peace between oppositional forces often outweighed the moral imperative 
of seeking to punish those responsible for perpetrating human rights atrocities. 
The “third wave of democratization” in Latin America during the 1980s con-
tributed greatly to this trend, with the use of immunity measures in negotiated 
transitions becoming an important bargaining chip in brokering political impasse 
in South and Central America.1 
Certainly, the Latin American experience has played a significant role in 
shaping the debates and direction of transitional justice in several respects. The 
consistent use of amnesties in the region contributed to the growing acceptance 
of amnesties in the 1980s.2 By the end of the Cold War, the transitional justice 
discourse in Latin America centered largely around the truth v. justice debate, 
which put at issue whether a political transition could or should include crimi-
nal trials. Political leaders of these countries often justified the use of amnesty 
in the name of peace, an argument that went largely unquestioned and resulted 
in a sort of a political balancing test that more often tipped in favor of assuring 
political stability over criminal justice in post-conflict or post-authoritarian set-
tings. Nevertheless, to assure accountability, these countries often formed truth 
commissions to conduct investigations and to provide a mechanism for truth 
telling for the benefit of victim-survivors and society at large. As a result, Latin 
America helped popularize the truth commission model, reliance upon which 
grew as a way to compensate for compromised justice schemes. While at first 
truth commissions were believed to be a “second-best” option,3 they soon beca-
me complementary and necessary measures for confronting past repressive and 
violent regimes through restorative justice. 
Later, Latin America once again helped reshape the terms of the truth 
v. justice debate in the 1990s. With national justice largely foreclosed in tran-
sitional Latin American countries in the 1980s, many victim-survivors and 
their advocates resorted to international human rights enforcement bodies 
like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) for a remedy. As 
1Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice 53 (2000).
2 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth Commissions and Amnesties in Latin America: The Second Genera-
tion, 92 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 313, 313–15 (1998) (offering a historical view of the Latin 
American experience with amnesties and its impact on the general acceptance of these immunity 
measures).
3 See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 Yale L.J. 2537, 2546 n.32 (1991) (“Whatever salutary effects it can produce, 
[a truth commission] is no substitute for . . . prosecutions. Indeed, to the extent that such an 
undertaking purports to replace criminal punishment . . . it diminishes the authority of the legal 
process . . . .”). But cf. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After 
Genocide and Mass Violence 88 (1998) (arguing that truth commissions are not “a second best 
alternative to prosecutions,” but instead can be a form better suited to meet the many goals 
pertinent to transitional politics).
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a result, international human rights law jurisprudence, frequently discussed 
by learned jurists, strengthened recognition of individual rights while slowly 
chipping away at absolute state sovereignty. Although a state’s prerogative to 
use amnesties dates to antiquity,4 the human rights movement suddenly plan-
ted serious questions about such immunity measures legitimacy through three 
main arguments: first, international law creates a state duty to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish those responsible for serious violations of human rights; 
second, international law also provides victims a fundamental right to justice 
(the “victims rights argument”); and third, post-conflict policy recognizes that 
criminal justice is good for democracy and the rule of law.5 As a consequence, 
the truth v. justice question began to tip in favor of criminal trials because the 
rights of victims now factored into a balancing equation that once only consi-
dered the preferences of political leaders and elites.
Roughly at the same time as the development of human rights law, a paral-
lel development in international criminal law also laid inroads to undermine the 
validity of amnesties. Specifically, the end of the Cold War permitted renewed at-
tention to the use of international and hybrid tribunals for criminal prosecutions, 
a remedy left largely dormant since the Nuremburg trials in 1945. Jurispruden-
ce emanating from these tribunals solidified the principle of individual criminal 
liability for egregious human rights violations, which previously was thought to 
trigger only liability based on the theory of the wrongful acts of states. 
These streams of international human rights law and international cri-
minal law together helped cause a paradigmatic shift. Today, amnesties are no 
longer assumed to be unconditionally lawful within an international legal fra-
mework.6 Instead, many scholars now acknowledge that to be legitimate, am-
nesties must conform to legal norms. This has created a standard of “qualified 
amnesties” with customary and treaty law prohibiting bars to prosecution for 
war crimes, enumerated treaty crimes, and crimes against humanity. Yet, this 
discourse suggests that it is still possible for nations to resort to amnesties for 
other serious human rights violations. 
With regard to this last point, this Article responds to an apparent gap in 
the scholarly literature which fails to merge the fields of human rights law and 
international criminal law—a step that would resolve the current debate as to 
whether any amnesty in transitional justice settings is lawful. More specifically, 
even though both fields are a subset of transitional justice in general, the discipli-
ne of international criminal law still supports the theory of “qualified amnesties” 
in transitional justice schemes, while international human rights law now stands 
for the proposition that no amnesty is lawful in those settings. This Article brings 
4 Teitel, supra note 1, at 58 (writing that amnesties were granted to nearly all participants in the 
Athenian Civil War in 403 B.C.). For a general discussion of amnesties, see Gwen K. Young, All 
the Truth and as Much Justice as Possible, 9 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 209 (2003) (presenting a 
definitional overview of amnesties).
5 Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-
American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty Possible?, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 173, 182 (2002).
6 See discussion infra Part II. 
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attention to this new development through a discussion of the Barrios Altos case, 
a seminal decision issued by the IACtHR in 2001.7 
Barrios Altos arose out of a dispute concerning one amnesty law, promulga-
ted in 1995 by former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, which extended im-
munity to all state agents responsible for serious human rights violations during 
Peru’s internal armed conflict between 1980 and 2000. When Fujimori unexpec-
tedly fled the country in 2000, the transitional government sought clarification 
from the IACtHR on the amnesty laws to determine whether its transitional jus-
tice experience could include criminal trials. The result was a prompt decision 
in which the IACtHR declared immunity measures such as amnesty laws to be 
contrary to state obligations under international human rights law, a holding that 
can be interpreted to outlaw all amnesties for acts that constitute human rights 
crimes. Yet recent scholarship, most notably from the international criminal law 
field, has ignored this decision or otherwise interpreted it overly narrowly.8 This 
Article responds by offering a more in-depth understanding of the Barrios Altos de-
cision in order to inform the ongoing academic debates on the evolving doctrine 
on amnesties in transitional justice schemes.
In addition, this Article seeks to reveal how an international human rights 
decision can dramatically impact state practice, thus also contributing to a pending 
question in international human rights law as to whether such jurisprudence is 
effective in increasing human rights protections. As a result of the IACtHR ru-
ling, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) fully embraced the 
principle of criminal justice, seeking to conduct its own investigations to support 
state efforts to initiate criminal prosecutions. Barrios Altos dramatically altered the 
Peruvian transitional justice experience, eventually leading to prosecutions of police 
officers as well as military and civilian leaders, including Fujimori himself. As one of 
the more recent transitional justice experiences, the Peruvian experience offers an 
important look at how the concept of criminal justice may now figure as a central 
component of transitional justice schemes. Additionally, the Barrios Altos decision 
has also set a new precedent for the region, leading other Latin American countries 
to annul infamous amnesty laws of the past and finally initiate criminal trials. In 
light of these recent developments, this Article suggests that the truth v. justice dilem-
ma may no longer exist. Instead, criminal justice must be done.
To develop this conclusion, Part I of this Article first offers an historical 
overview of the truth v. justice debate in the field of transitional justice, with a 
focus on amnesties. In particular, Part I examines the Latin American experience 
and how it shaped the terms of this debate that eventually pushed criminal justice 
to the sidelines of transitional justice. Part II discusses how a changing interna-
tional legal context helped to contest the use of immunity measures and create 
the current standard of “qualified amnesties” through international human rights 
law and international criminal law. Part III then turns to the specific story of Peru 
in order to offer an historical example of how amnesties create a culture of im-
7 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001).
8 See discussion infra Part V.
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punity in national settings characterized by serious human rights violations. Part 
IV explains how Peru helped to reverse this trend of impunity as well as create a 
new standard in transitional justice schemes by resorting to the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights. Part V offers a systematic analysis of the Barrios Altos 
case in order to demonstrate how it may be interpreted to outlaw all amnesties, a 
conclusion also supported by subsequent state practice, which is explored in Part 
VI. The Article concludes by looking at the implications of this new legal develo-
pment in regard to amnesties in order to encourage future research regarding the 
role of criminal justice in transitional justice schemes.
2 Truth v. Justice: the controversy of amnesty within transitional 
justice schemes 
This Part offers an historical look at the field of transitional justice. Despite 
its origins in principles of criminal justice, transitional justice evolved to exclude 
the use of criminal trials in the decades following World War II due to the wi-
despread adoption of immunity measures, such as amnesties, in post-conflict and 
post-authoritarian countries, especially those in Latin America. This development 
gave rise to the truth v. justice debate, the evolution and terms of which will be 
discussed in order to illustrate how international law eventually moved towards 
bringing criminal justice back into transitional justice schemes.
The criminal justice origins of transitional justice run deep. In fact, Ruti 
Teitel traces the genealogy of transitional justice back to the criminal trials at 
Nuremburg from 1945 to 1949,9 reminding us that the public imagination and 
understanding of transitional justice often conjures up images of criminal trials 
and the punishment of the culprits of displaced regimes.10 Certainly, the prosecu-
tions of prominent members of Nazi Germany’s economic, political, and military 
leadership set a new standard: state actors could be held criminally liable for state 
crimes.11 Consequently, the Nuremburg trials set an international standard, inspi-
ring the trials of perpetrators linked to World War II crimes in other countries.12 
Above all else, the Nuremburg trials contributed to the birth of the transitional 
justice field, to which the general fields of international criminal law and interna-
tional human rights law arguably belong.13 
9 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 69, 70 (2003).
10 Teitel, supra note 1, at 27; see also Eric Blumenson, National Amnesties and International Justice, 2 
Eyes on the ICC 1, 4 (2005) (concurring by writing that “the duty to bring the worst criminals 
to justice is a deep sentiment, or an article of faith”).
11 This precept now underscores the subject of international criminal law. See Teitel, supra note 1, 
at 74. See generally Robert E. Conot, Justice at Nuremberg (1983); Telford Taylor, The Anatomy 
of the Nuremburg Trials: A Personal Memoir (1992); Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecu-
tion of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 551 (2006) (providing a detailed 
history of the history of the Nuremburg trials).
12 Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial 10 (1996) (naming Italy, Japan, Austria, France, 
Belgium, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as places where additional trials occurred).
13 See Minow, supra note 3, at  27 (1998) (discussing the human rights movement arising out of 
Nuremburg); Teitel, supra note 1, at 32 (drawing the connection between international criminal 
law and transitional justice).
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Although precise definitions of the term “transitional justice” vary, the term 
ultimately rests on the search for justice in response to past episodes of widespre-
ad human rights violations, most often those associated with armed conflict, au-
thoritarian regimes, and apartheid.14 In these situations, trials can serve a clearly 
political purpose by laying the foundation for a transition that disavows the po-
litical norms of predecessors and works “to construct a new legal order.”15 In this 
sense, trials can draw a “thick line” between the past and present to prevent new 
cycles of violence and to help assure the future of a new democracy.16 History, ho-
wever, has shown time and again the difficulties countries face in trying to “close 
the books” on a past marred by widespread human rights violations in order to 
build a new legal and political order.17 
Partly as a result of these problems, the initial enthusiasm for criminal justice 
generated by Nuremburg was short lived. Geopolitical changes that coincided with 
Nuremburg, namely the Cold War, made international trials less politically feasi-
ble and thereby also contributed to the decline of international criminal justice.18 
A Westphalian philosophy promoted a policy of noninterference that deferred to 
national sovereigns to decide the most appropriate means of achieving peace.19 Ac-
cordingly, despite the millions of people victimized by brutal regimes since World 
War II, criminal prosecutions for such oppression in that period have been rare.20
2.1 Amnesty in the americas
The third wave of democratization in Latin America during the 1980s con-
tributed to the international tendency to accept that criminal justice could be 
compromised during delicate political transformations.21 With the exception of 
14 See Louis Bickford, Transitional Justice, in Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Hu-
manity 1045, 1045–46 (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2005); Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The 
Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 Yale L.J. 2009, 2013 (1997) (noting the qualitative 
transition refers to a “bounded period, spanning two regimes”). 
15 Teitel, supra note 1, at 30.
16 Juan E. Méndez, In Defense of Transitional Justice, in Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in 
New Democracies 1, 7 (A. James McAdams ed., 1997).
17 See generally Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (2004).
18 For example, the regime changes in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) follow-
ing World War II took on a wholly local dimension and further undermined any assumption 
that criminal justice would be pursued. See Nino, supra note 12, at 16. See generally Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 
619, 629 (2005) (providing an overview of the concept of sovereignty). 
19 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 75–76 (6th ed. 1998) (discussing the 
principle of sovereignty in international law). See generally Stéphane Beaulac, The Westphalian 
Legal Orthodoxy—Myth or Reality?, 2 J. Hist. Int’l L. 148 (2000) (discussing the history of the 
Westphalian doctrine).
20 See John Dugard, Retrospective Justice: International Law and the South African Model, in Transi-
tional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, supra note 16, at 269, 276 (discussing 
a few of the rare cases of prosecution in Greece, Ethiopia, and Rwanda); Christopher C. Joyner, 
Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the Search for Ac-
countability, 26 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 591, 593–94 (1998) (discussing the rarity of criminal 
prosecutions since Nuremburg).
21 See Jaime Malamud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?, 
12 Hum. Rts. Q. 1, 1–6 (1990).
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Bolivia,22 retroactive justice for state crimes in Latin America became uncommon 
in this period due both to inaction and to the use of amnesties and pardons on a 
frequent basis.23 Thus, the Latin American experience began to suggest a model of 
“truth and justice as far as possible.”24 
The experience of Argentina, in particular, reveals how practical concerns 
outweighed principled ones when criminal trials put at risk the complex and de-
licate undertaking of political transition. In 1980, the Argentine military dicta-
torship agreed to hold national elections conditioned on the passage of amnes-
ty laws.25 The subsequently elected president, Raúl Alfonsín, however, created 
the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), which 
eventually led to criminal prosecutions of top military leaders.26 Alfonsín’s efforts 
soon backfired when the military showed its dissatisfaction through a series of 
uprisings. In response, the president passed a series of laws including the Ley de 
Punto Final (Law of Full Stop), which established an end date to the trials, as well 
as the Ley de Obediencia Debida (Law of Due Obedience), which provided immu-
nity to lower ranked, subordinate officers if they acted within the scope of duty.27 
Both laws were perceived as “undercover” amnesties that eventually frustrated 
national attempts to prosecute perpetrators of human rights crimes.28  
Notwithstanding its struggles to assure criminal justice, Argentina establi-
shed a new model of transitional justice that looked to other mechanisms for 
confronting the past and helped make truth commissions an acceptable way to 
22 Bolivia stands apart from its neighbors as one of the earliest transitional experiences in Latin 
America in which criminal trials for human rights abuses were held in a political transition 
from a military dictatorship. On April 21, 1993, after a seven-year trial, its supreme court 
convicted former Bolivian military dictator García Meza (1980–81) to thirty years in prison. It 
also convicted some of his top ministers and paramilitary members. See René Antonio Mayorga, 
Democracy Dignified and an End to Impunity: Bolivia’s Military Dictatorship on Trial, in Transitional 
Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, supra note 16, at 61, 61–63. This phase ended 
eighteen years of military rule (1964–82) due to what René Antonio Mayorga terms the “broad 
societal demand for justice” coupled with the military’s weak and discredited status. Id. at 71.  
23 Nino, supra note 12, at 39. For a discussion of amnesties and basic definitional terms, see 
generally Roderick O’Brien, Amnesty and International Law, 74 Nordic J. Int’l L. 261 (2005).
24 Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence 63 (2001) (writing on the Latin 
American transitional justice experience).
25 The military, led by General Rafael Videla, overthrew civil socialist leader Juan Perón in 1973, 
but the military’s defeat in the war with Britain over the Malvinas Islands (Falklands) largely 
discredited them. See Carlos H. Acuña & Catalina Smulovitz, Guarding the Guardians in Argen-
tina: Some Lessons About the Risks and Benefits of Empowering the Courts, in Transitional Justice and 
the Rule of Law in New Democracies, supra note 16, at 93, 101–02 (discussing the Ley de Pacifi-
cación Nacional (Law of National Pacification) that granted immunity to armed and police forces 
for crimes committed in context of the military repression between May 25, 1973, and June 17, 
1982); see also Jaime Malamud-Goti, Punishing Human Rights Abuses in Fledgling Democracies: The 
Case of Argentina, in Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice 160 (Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995) (discussing Argentina’s amnesty laws).
26 See Acuña & Smulovitz, supra note 25, at 104.
27 Id. at 107–08.
28 See Luis Márquez Urtubey, Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation for Crimes Committed in 
Argentina: Barrios Altos, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 109, 112 (2005) (providing a history of Ar-
gentina’s amnesty laws). When Carlos S. Menem became president in July 1989, he pardoned 
top generals and 277 military personnel to attempt to resolve growing internal tensions. Acuña 
& Smulovitz, supra note 25, at 109–10. 
Lisa J. Laplante
66 EJJL                                                                        Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 59-116, Edição Especial 2012
fill the gap left by compromised criminal justice.29 By the end of the 1980s, truth 
commissions in Latin America became as commonplace as the amnesty laws that 
compelled their conception.30 
By the time Chile underwent its transition to civil rule following the end 
of Augusto Pinochet’s military dictatorship in 1990, victims there also faced se-
emingly absolute bars to criminal justice for crimes resulting from his repressive 
rule.31 At the time, Pinochet still maintained power despite having been voted out 
of office,32 and the courts remained reluctant to pursue investigations, especially 
since a sweeping amnesty law passed in 1978 covered all crimes committed by 
the armed forces from 1973 to 1978.33 Pinochet’s successor, President Patricio 
Aylwin, instead formed a truth commission to provide a “second-best option” and 
attempted “to serve a cause—the pursuit of retrospective justice—that is more 
effectively undertaken by the courts.”34 In doing so, Aylwin essentially adopted 
the position of “[f]ull disclosure of the truth, and justice to the extent possible.”35
Jorge Correa Sutil points to the continued power of the military to explain 
why Chile could only secure “a partial truth, a partial justice, and a partial healing 
of old wounds.”36 Unlike “transition through rupture” or total collapse, Chile’s ex-
perience required negotiations with an existing military power base which ultima-
tely resulted in pacification laws that limited the ability of politicians and courts 
to do justice.37 The residual power of former regimes generally helped to assure 
29 Truth commissions vary from country to country but are usually official and temporary bodies 
created to investigate and publish historical accounts of past widespread violations of human rights. 
See generally Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001) 
(providing a comprehensive account of truth commissions in over thirty countries since 1970). 
30 See Emily W. Schabacker, Reconciliation or Justice and Ashes: Amnesty Commissions and the Duty to 
Punish Human Rights Offenses, 12 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (1999).
31 In 1973, Pinochet overthrew socialist president Salvador Allende in a coup. See Naomi Roht-
Arriaza & Lauren Gibson, The Developing Jurisprudence on Amnesty, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 843, 846–49 
(1998) (providing a historical account of events leading to Chile’s amnesty laws). 
32 For example, even though growing discontent had led to a referendum that voted Pinochet out 
of office in 1988, the 1980 Constitution allowed him to continue to hold power as commander 
in chief of the army until 1990. Jorge Correa Sutil, “No Victorious Army Has Ever Been Prosecuted 
. . .”: The Unsettled Story of Transitional Justice in Chile, in Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law 
in New Democracies, supra note 16, at 123, 131–33. Pinochet also continued to hold a lifetime 
Senate seat after being voted out of office.
33 Rebecca Evans, Pinochet in London—Pinochet in Chile: International and Domestic Politics in Hu-
man Rights Policy, 28 Hum. Rts. Q. 207, 220–21 (2006) (describing Chile’s amnesty laws); Sutil, 
supra note 32, at 127.
34 Sutil, supra note 32, at 134–35.
35 Id. at 133 (citing Aylwin’s inaugural speech on March 12, 1990). There were attempts to 
challenge the amnesty laws based on international law, which were eventually rejected by the 
Chilean Supreme Court. Id. at 135–36; see also Robert J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Chal-
lenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile’s New Model, 62 
Fordham L. Rev. 905, 919–20 (1994) (providing a historical account of the attempts to annul 
Chile’s amnesty law). 
36 Sutil, supra note 32, at 149. The Commission on Truth and Reconciliation was instructed to 
clarify the truth in a “comprehensive” manner and recommend how to rehabilitate the victims. 
Working nine months in camera, the commission produced “The Rettig Report” (named after 
the commission’s chairman Raúl Rettig). See Margaret Popkin & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Truth as 
Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 79, 84–86 (1995) (de-
scribing the work of the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation).
37 Mayorga, supra note 22, at 67.
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impunity, especially where there were negotiations relating to their continued pre-
sence in local power structures. In these situations, rather than seeking full-scale 
criminal prosecutions against former regime members, the question became “how 
much and to what extent justice was possible.” 38 
By the 1990s, with amnesty laws established as common fare, the focus 
turned almost exclusively to truth commissions. Transitions in Central America 
often mirrored those in South America, resorting to immunity mechanisms to 
avoid criminal justice and relying almost exclusively on truth commissions to 
assure that the government provided some type of accountability for past wron-
gs.39 The experiences in Latin America began to shape what would eventually 
be well-recognized as some of the fundamental dilemmas in the growing field of 
transitional justice and would help define the terms of the truth v. justice debate.40 
2.2 Promoting truth commissions over criminal justice
Pursuant to the Latin American experience, the “threshold dilemma” of 
transitional justice became choosing what kind of justice.41 The original strong 
link of justice to criminal trials spearheaded by Nuremburg was weakened by an 
“an increased pragmatism in and politicization of the law.”42 This process, howe-
ver, was not without resistance. Even when state practice seemed to suggest the 
futility of any debate, a stronghold of justice advocates remained skeptical that 
38 Sutil, supra note 32, at 133.
39 For example, five days after El Salvador’s truth commission published its report in 1993 urg-
ing criminal accountability for the human rights violations caused during its twelve-year civil 
war, the government passed an amnesty law barring criminal investigations and trials. Santiago 
A. Canton, Amnesty Laws, in Victims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Human Rights System 
and Transitional Justice in Latin America 167, 169 (Mónica Ávila Paulette & Catherine A. 
Sunshine eds., Gretta K. Siebentritt trans., 2007). Similarly, the Guatemalan Historical Clari-
fication Commission produced its final report, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, on February 25, 
1999, but was prohibited from naming perpetrators or individualizing responsibility. Joanna R. 
Quinn & Mark Freeman, Lessons Learned: Practical Lessons Gleaned from Inside the Truth Commis-
sions of Guatemala and South Africa, 25 Hum. Rts. Q. 1117, 1122 (2003). See generally Popkin & 
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 36, at 91–93 (describing the origins of Guatemala’s truth commission).
40 See Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 Hum. Rts. Q. 95, 
99 (2008).
41 Teitel, supra note 14, at 2014 (discussing the function of law in political transformation). See 
generally Luc Huyse, Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the 
Past, 20 Law & Soc. Inquiry 51 (1995) (positing that transitional regimes face political choices 
in how to respond to the crimes of their predecessors).
42 Teitel, supra note 9, at 70 (discussing the phases of transitional justice development).
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realpolitik could once and for all terminate the discussion.43 Their persuasion relied 
largely on legal arguments.44 
Nevertheless, the notion of justice began to take on a broader meaning, pu-
shed in large part by a challenge to the binary approach to the matter of accoun-
tability that reduced the choice to trials or no trials. As Richard Goldstone, Justice 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, comments: “Certainly there is no one 
simple solution capable of addressing the complexities and subtleties inherent in a 
range of different factual situations. The peculiar history, politics, and social struc-
ture of a society will always inform the appropriate approach to this question in 
any given context.”45 Part of this development favoring truth commissions without 
trials also related to the weakness of national courts in matters of criminal justice 
because “[c]ourts in newly constituted or reemerging civilian regimes must contend 
with a legacy of a lack of independence, ties to the old regime, mistrust, fear and 
corruption, or the inexperience of newly appointed personnel.”46 The perceived 
impossibility or impracticality of domestic trials led to their elimination altogether. 
43 Some reasons for prosecuting include discouraging future offenses, minimizing “self-help” 
vengeance, promoting reconciliation, respecting the rule of law, and strengthening a new demo-
cratic regime. See Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report, in Aspen Inst., State Crimes: Punishment 
or Pardon? 1, 3–4 (1989). As clearly stated by M. Cherif Bassiouni, “If peace is not intended to 
be a brief interlude between conflicts, then in order to avoid future conflict, it must encompass 
what justice is intended to accomplish: prevent, deter, punish, and rehabilitate.” M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Autumn 1996, at 9, 13; see also Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 
25 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 283, 305–17 (2007) (summarizing the arguments for and against criminal 
prosecutions). For a fuller discussion of the debates, see generally Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraor-
dinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. 
J. 39 (2002) (discussing the justice theories attributed to transitional justice); Richard L. Siegel, 
Transitional Justice: A Decade of Debate and Experience, 20 Hum. Rts. Q. 433 (1998) (outlining the 
terms of the truth v. justice debate).
44 Chronologists mark the 1988 Aspen Institute Conference in Colorado entitled “State Crimes: 
Punishment or Pardon” as the inaugurating event for this debate. See generally Alice H. Henkin, 
State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Conference Report), in 1 Transitional Justice: How Emerging De-
mocracies Reckon With Former Regimes 184 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (presenting a summary of 
the conference). The debate took on special focus through a scholarly exchange in the Yale Law 
Journal between Diane Orentlicher and Carlos S. Nino, who served as a legal advisor to Argentina’s 
President Alfonsín. See Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 2540 (arguing for a duty to prosecute “espe-
cially atrocious crimes”); Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into 
Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 Yale L.J. 2619, 2639–40 (1991) (arguing that political contexts 
must be taken into account when designing an approach to criminal justice in transitions); Diane 
F. Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 Yale L.J. 2641, 2641–42 (1991) (rebutting Nino’s 
interpretation of her viewpoint on the inflexibility of the positive duty to prosecute). In her au-
thoritative first article, Orentlicher sets the legal parameters for a state’s duty to prosecute. Nino, 
in turn, perceives this as too rigid for the political realities of countries in transition and suggests 
that we need to be sympathetic to the factual circumstances of each country. Nino also notes that 
an “unrelenting” duty to prosecute may put leaders under pressure and make them look weak. 
Nino, supra note 12, at 187. This debate culminated in 1995 with the publication of Neil Kritz’s 
three-volume book presenting the wide array of opinions on the matter. See generally Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, supra.
45 See Richard Goldstone, Preface to Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg to Bosnia 
9, 9 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds., 1999).
46 Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 31, at 844. 
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For that reason, Chilean human rights lawyer José Zalaquett has argued that 
“the real question is to adopt, for every specific situation, the measures that are 
both feasible and most conducive to the purpose of contributing to build or recons-
truct a just order.”47 In this stream of discussion, truth commissions were discussed 
as promoting “a different, possibly better, kind of justice than do criminal convic-
tion and punishment—‘restorative’ justice.”48 Soon, transitional justice literature 
began to examine more fully the validity of alternative justice mechanisms, such as 
truth commissions.49 The argument was made that these mechanisms provided a 
better historical account of the past by revealing the patterns, causes, and context of 
abuses and by challenging the prevailing wisdom regarding former regimes.50 
Transitional justice expanded to include questions concerning how to “heal” 
whole societies, with a restorative focus.51 As Nigel Biggar explains, “[t] hinking 
of criminal justice primarily in terms not of retribution but of the vindication of 
victims significantly relaxes the tension between justice and the politics of making 
peace.”52 His definition of justice folds other kinds of justice (restorative, reparati-
ve, historical) into a general category of justice, lessening the urgency of criminal 
trials. In this way, collecting victim testimonies, awarding reparations, and ensu-
ring institutional reforms serve as a proxy for criminal justice.53 Biggar poses the 
question: “Making peace or doing justice: must we choose?”54 In other words, if 
all measures count equally toward the same overarching goal of peace and recon-
ciliation, then the idea of choice becomes moot. Yet Biggar frames the perceived 
choice in terms of political demands to make peace and moral claims for justice, 
overlooking the fact that demands for justice also arise out of legal claims.55 
47 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Need for Moral Reconstruction in the Wake of Past Human Rights 
Violations: An Interview with José Zalaquett, in Human Rights in Political Transitions: Gettysburg 
to Bosnia, supra note 45, at 195, 197; see also José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations 
Committed by Former Governments: Applicable Principles and Political Constraints, 13 Hamline L. Rev. 
623, 628 (1990). The issue of particular historical and political contexts counsels that “true 
political reconstruction is always a matter of local initiative that does not lend itself to external 
compulsion . . . .” Carla Hesse & Robert Post, Introduction to Human Rights in Political Transi-
tions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, supra note 45, at 13, 19.
48 Kent Greenawalt, Amnesty’s Justice, in Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions 
189, 198 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
49 See, e.g., Timothy Phillips & Mary Albon, When Prosecution Is Not Possible: Alternative Means 
of Seeking Accountability for War Crimes, in War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg 244 (Belinda 
Cooper ed., 1999).
50 See Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclamation, in My 
Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity 1, 13–14 (Eric 
Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004). See generally Lisa J. Laplante, The Peruvian Truth Com-
mission’s Historical Memory Project: Empowering Truth-Tellers to Confront Truth Deniers, 6 J. Hum. Rts. 
433 (2007) (providing an overview of the justifications for truth-telling exercises like a truth 
commission). It is noteworthy that while at the Aspen Institute conference there was no agree-
ment on the obligation to punish, all participants agreed on the basic obligation to investigate 
the truth. Henkin, supra note 44, at 186. 
51 Teitel, supra note 9, at 77.
52 Nigel Biggar, Making Peace or Doing Justice: Must We Choose?, in Burying the Past: Making Peace 
and Doing Justice After Civil Conflict 3, 16–17 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003).
53 See id. at 11–13.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 13.
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This period of scholarly debate helped elevate the status of truth commis-
sions from a “second-best” alternative to a mechanism at least as important as 
criminal justice in the transitional justice movement.56 Yet in this phase, the mo-
vement often went too far to the other extreme. The celebration of truth commis-
sions seemed to overshadow criminal trials, making them seem an almost bygone, 
antiquated feature of justice.57 Martha Minow, a proponent of the restorative 
view of justice, described supporters of criminal justice as idealists who espouse 
“stirring but often shrill and impractical claims, such as the ‘duty to prosecute’” 
and as scholars who are remote from nations struggling with transitional justice.58 
Yet Minow’s account overlooks internal divisions within nations and the fact that 
local actors, especially victims-survivors, do not easily compromise their demands 
for criminal justice.59 Indeed, ongoing local challenges to amnesty laws helped 
keep the embers of the debate slowly burning, ready to explode through an even-
tual resurgence of international criminal law.
2.3 Foreshadowing change: south african victim-survivors 
challenging amnesties 
 Experience on the ground, as documented by anthropologists, has shown 
that the theoretical debates often overlooked the demands of victim-survivors, 
whose hunger for trials remained even when elites compromised criminal justice. 
The events that unfolded around the creation of South Africa’s Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission in 1995 demonstrate this reality.60 The South African expe-
rience not only helped make truth commissions a part of popular culture, but also 
56 See generally Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Repara-
tions in Post-Truth Commission Peru, 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 228 (2007) (discussing the heightened status 
of truth commissions in transitional justice); Charles Villa-Vicencio, A Different Kind of Justice: 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1 Contemp. Just. Rev. 407 (1999) (discuss-
ing favorably the truth commission model used by South Africa); Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why 
Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth Com-
missions Meet, 49 Emory L.J. 205, 220 (2000) (advising against an absolute duty to prosecute).
57 See, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 
118, 119–21 (2000) (providing a summary of the nine arguments against resorting to criminal 
prosecution following mass atrocities). 
58 .Minow, supra note 3, at 28. 
59 See Laplante & Theidon, supra note 56, at 241–44 (sharing ethnographic research on the 
resilient quest for criminal trials).
60 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission rose to such a high status that it 
made discussion of the topic mainstream and spawned perhaps more scholarly analysis than any 
other truth commission. See, e.g., Kader Asmal, Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African 
Experience in Perspective, 63 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 10–19 (2000) (discussing South Africa’s Truth Com-
mission and amnesty laws); John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 
8 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 277 (1998) (offering an overview of South Africa’s amnesty 
laws and their subsequent legal challenge); Sam Garkawe, The South African Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission: A Suitable Model to Enhance the Role and Rights of the Victims of Gross Violations 
of Human Rights?, 27 Melb. U. L. Rev. 334 (2003) (discussing the amnesty process from the 
perspective of victims); Rosemary Nagy, Violence, Amnesty and Transitional Law: “Private” Acts and 
“Public” Truth in South Africa, 1 Afr. J. Legal Stud. 1, 3 (2004) (arguing that amnesty led to a 
“truncated” truth). 
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simultaneously created the inference that amnesties are an acceptable feature of 
transitional justice.61 Indeed, amnesty in exchange for truth constituted a central 
aspect of South Africa’s 1995 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act, promising complete immunity to perpetrators of crimes “associated with a 
political objective . . . in the course of the conflicts of the past” but only if they 
offered “a full disclosure of all relevant facts.”62 The law permitted some of the 
country’s most notorious perpetrators to escape justice and created an outcry, 
mostly among victims, even while it was applauded internationally as a model for 
future truth commissions. 
Eventually this local disagreement led to a legal challenge of the Act ba-
sed on both national and international law.63 The South African Constitutional 
Court, though, dismissed the plaintiff ’s international law arguments.64 It held 
that, in fact, the National Unity and Reconciliation Act was “compatible” with 
international law, and pointed to the Latin American experience to validate the 
use of amnesties in political transitions.65 Although reluctantly concurring in the 
judgment, in his separate opinion Justice John Didcott explicitly recognized the 
compromises being asked from South Africa’s citizens in upholding the constitu-
tionality of South Africa’s amnesty laws because he conceded that the amnesty 
laws denied the victims’ their right to justice.66 
Significantly, while victim-survivors rejected the decision and lobbied for 
full criminal justice, the press coverage and public reaction to the decision dismis-
sed their concerns due to the hegemonic language of reconciliation.67 Ultimately, 
the judgment served as a “watershed” in South Africa’s transition as “a reconci-
liatory version of human rights talk triumphed” over one that put criminal justice 
front and center.68 Richard Wilson concludes, however, that “[t]he most damaging 
61 See Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van der Merwe, Introduction: Assessing the South African Tran-
sitional Justice Model, in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? 1, 8 
(Audrey R. Chapman & Hugo Van der Merwe eds., 2008) (commenting that the South African 
truth commission “captured public attention throughout the world and provided the model 
for succeeding truth commissions”); Catherine Jenkins, ‘They Have Built a Legal System Without 
Punishment’: Reflections on the Use of Amnesty in the South African Transition, 64 Transformation: 
Critical Persp. on S. Afr. 27, 31 (2007) (noting that internationally “the policy of ‘reconcilia-
tion’ adopted in South Africa, of which the amnesty process is seen as a part, has commanded 
considerable respect”).
62 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 s. 20(1), 20(7), available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/act9534.htm.
63 The widow of Steven Biko, founder of the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa 
and who died from torture in 1977, was the first to bring a case. See Hesse & Post, supra note 
47, at 13–14.
64 See Richard A. Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the Post-
Apartheid State 167–70 (2001) (providing a historical account of the South African Constitutional Court’s 
ruling on the country’s amnesty laws).
65 .Id. at 169–70.
66 Id. at 172.
67 Id. at 171.
68 Id. at 172. But see Jonathan Klaaren & Howard Varney, A Second Bite at the Amnesty Cherry? 
Constitutional and Policy Issues Around Legislation for a Second Amnesty, 117 S. Afr. L.J. 572, 581–92 
(2000) (offering a critical analysis of the Court’s decision). 
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outcome of truth commissions is a result of their equating of human rights with 
reconciliation and amnesty.”69 
Wilson speaks of “the large gap” between political reality and the survi-
vors’ expectations of justice, since the vast majority of survivors preferred pu-
nishment.70 Thus, unlike the passive view of victims presented by Biggar, Wilson 
introduces us to the idea of victims as protagonists. Transitional justice projects 
must consider the demands of victims and what they need for closure. These con-
siderations put into question the legitimacy of amnesties. 
Wilson discusses how the ambiguity of international law regarding the le-
gitimacy of amnesties at the time of South Africa’s transition made the issue less 
clear. As Wilson states: “International criminal law is highly ambivalent on the 
question of amnesty, and the tension between national amnesties and internatio-
nal human rights treaties has a long history.”71 Writing in 2001, Wilson points 
out that this ambiguity allows one, by “quoting selectively,” to “construct an ar-
gument to either justify or negate a national amnesty.”72 At that time, the well-
-accepted doctrine of sovereign prerogative gave an individual’s right to justice far 
less weight than the social good of stability.73 With great foresight, Wilson predic-
ted that the “stand-off between ‘international retributionists’ and the ‘nationalist 
pragmatists’ over what international law definitively states on the question of 
amnesty is likely to shift in coming years,” especially in light of the increasing 
importance of the International Criminal Court (ICC).74
3 A changing global context: a legal framework to challenge 
amnesties
As the new millennium neared, just as it seemed the truth v. justice debate 
tipped against criminal justice, the legitimacy of amnesty laws took on “renewed 
importance” in a new international context.75 Indeed, although successor regi-
mes since antiquity have had to deal with the crimes of their predecessors and 
frequently resorted to amnesties, contemporary developments and globalization 
began to give this task “an international dimension” through the growth and 
recognition of both international human rights and international crimes.”76 One 
sees two parallel movements that now seem to be converging, suggesting that cri-
minal justice may once again be a solid pillar in the transitional justice paradigm. 
69 Wilson, supra note 64, at 228.
70 Id. at 25.
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 169.
73 See id. at 26. 
74 Id. at 171. Other scholars and practitioners also speculated that the renewed international 
commitment to criminal justice would begin to change the terms of the truth v. justice debate. 
See, e.g., Juan E. Méndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 Hum. Rts. Q. 255, 256 (1997) (“Two 
or three years from now, analysts will have to reexamine everything said today about truth and 
justice in light of what these experiments produce.”).
75 William W. Burke-White, Reframing Impunity: Applying Liberal International Law Theory to an 
Analysis of Amnesty Legislation, 42 Harv. Int’l L.J. 467, 467 (2001).
76 Dugard, supra note 20, at 269.
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Today, a more solidified body of international law places new restrictions on local 
decisionmakers, suggesting that the choice that underscored the truth v. justice di-
lemma may be moot.77 Indeed, the transitional justice pendulum has now swung 
back towards a focus on criminal trials, but this time embedded in legal not moral 
terms, thereby leaving less room for political considerations and manipulations. 
Most significantly, with the birth of this new legal union we can glimpse the im-
pending demise of amnesty.
3.1 International criminal law: individual accountability for 
atrocities
Clearer legal limits on sovereign prerogatives during political transitions 
began to form half a century after World War II through the incremental develo-
pments of international criminal law. Even though the Nuremburg legacy did not 
increase the frequency of criminal trials, it did spawn a growing body of treaty law 
expressly requiring criminal prosecutions.78 Specific international crimes were co-
dified in the Genocide Convention,79 the Geneva Conventions of 1949,80 Protocol 
I and II of 1977,81 and the Convention Against Torture.82 This new international 
criminal framework was strengthened further upon the creation of the interna-
tional tribunals for Rwanda83 and the former Yugoslavia,84 and the establishment 
77 See Teitel, supra note 9, at 76. 
78 See Kristin Henrard, The Viability of National Amnesties in View of the Increasing Recognition of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility at International Law, 8 Mich. St. U.-Detroit C.L. J. Int’l L. 595, 
600 (1999) (tracing the creation of treaties prohibiting genocide, torture, and war crimes to the 
Nuremburg principles).
79 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. 
Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
80 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Ge-
neva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention]; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. Cer-
tain acts are specified in the Geneva Conventions as “grave breaches.” First Geneva Convention, 
supra, arts. 49–50; Second Geneva Convention, supra, arts. 50–51; Third Geneva Convention, 
supra, arts. 129–30; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra, arts. 146–47. Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies to conflicts of a noninternational nature. See, e.g., First Geneva 
Convention, supra, art. 3.
81 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),  June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
This protocol also identifies acts which are classified as “grave breaches.” See id. arts. 11, 85, 86. 
82 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
83 See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing an international tribunal 
for Rwanda).
84 See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing an international tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia).
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of the ICC.85 These developments established the legal norm that the most egre-
gious international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes, require punishment.86 
Suddenly, the status of amnesties became suspect once again as scholars and 
practitioners speculated whether the ICC would respect national legislation that 
contravened the very essence of its subject matter jurisdiction.87 The idea of immu-
nity took a strong hit after the surprise arrest of Pinochet in London in 1998 and 
the decision by the House of Lords to strip the former head of state of his immunity 
during extradition proceedings brought by a Spanish judge seeking to try Pinochet 
for human rights violations.88 This decision also demonstrated that national amnes-
ties have no legal effect in non-national, third country prosecutions.89 
A growing international grassroots movement then began to challenge the 
general acquiescence to the “pervasive practice of impunity” that let those guilty 
of murder to go “literally, scot-free.”90 The situation in Haiti became a quintessen-
tial example of amnesty failing to bring peace and deter future violence, further 
undermining the political rationale for amnesty.91 Policy arguments then arose in 
85 On July 17, 1998, delegates to the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome voted to adopt what is now called 
the “Rome Statute.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also United Na-
tions Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998). 
86 Dugard, supra note 60, at 278 (discussing the significance of the international tribunals cre-
ated in the 1990s).
87 Sang Wook Daniel Han, The International Criminal Court and National Amnesty, 12 Auckland 
U. L. Rev. 97, 97–98 (2006) (exploring the parameters of how the ICC would decide on do-
mestic amnesties); Dwight G. Newman, The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, 
and a Distributive Problem, 20 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 293, 296–99 (2004) (reviewing the debates 
over whether the ICC will respect national amnesties); Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of 
Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 481, 
483 (2003); Michael P. Scharf, The Amnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 507, 522–27 (1999) (arguing that the ICC should respect national 
amnesty laws in some situations); Trumbull, supra note 43, at 286 (concluding that even if do-
mestic amnesties have no binding effect on a third party’s ability to prosecute under the theory 
of universal jurisdiction, political reasons may cause one to defer to immunity measures). The 
status of domestic immunity measures also arose before the international tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia. See O’Brien, supra note 23, at 265–66. 
88 Evans, supra note 33, at 209–11 (discussing the history of the extradition proceedings against 
Pinochet); Andreas O’Shea, Pinochet and Beyond: The International Implications of Amnesty, 16 S. 
Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 642, 643 (2000) (discussing the extradition proceedings against Pinochet and 
their implications for the legality of national amnesties and universal jurisdiction).
89 O’Shea, supra note 88, at 643.
90 Joyner, supra note 20, at 595; see also Jenkins, supra note 61, at 29 (discussing the “battle 
against impunity” that occurred with the status of amnesty in flux).
91 Haiti has experienced continuing cycles of violence and repression in the period since the 
twenty-nine year “Duvalier Dynasty” (referring to dictator Francois Duvalier, who fled to exile 
in 1986), due in part to its failure “to expose, let alone punish, the crimes of the past.” Kenneth 
Roth, Human Rights in the Haitian Transition to Democracy, in Human Rights in Political Transi-
tions: Gettysburg to Bosnia, supra note 45, at 93, 95–97.
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favor of criminal justice.92 The idea of choice became viewed by top scholars as 
fallacious given that “the attainment of peace is not necessarily to the exclusion 
of justice, because justice is frequently necessary to attain peace.”93 Juan Méndez, 
now president of the International Center for Transitional Justice, wrote in 1997 
that transitional governments face “one of the hardest choices” given the tempta-
tion to equate reconciliation with “forgive-and-forget policy.”94 Nevertheless, he 
argued that wounds cannot be swept under the rug and warned against “tokenism 
and a false morality that only thinly disguises the perpetuation of impunity.”95 
The mantra of the movement was reflected in the preamble of the ICC’s 
Rome Statute, which called for “an end to impunity.”96 The creation of the ICC 
has been credited by some with ushering in a “new order of international crimi-
nal responsibility” to address gross abuses of human rights and fill in the gaps 
of domestic legal systems.97 Trials suddenly became “an essential component of 
reconciliation”98 and amnesties were the tools for perpetrating impunity rather 
than reconciling warring parties.99  
3.2 Human rights law: the right to justice and the duty to prosecute
One of the other significant challenges to amnesty arises out of the legal 
framework of international human rights law and the resulting “rights talk” which 
has made human rights dictum a global norm.100 What was once a matter of only 
national politics and morality now must be grappled with in universal legal terms. 
It is important to remember that the political transitions in Latin America occurred 
before a strong and cohesive international legal human rights framework existed, 
and thus the choice of approaches was presented in terms of “justice v. democracy”-
—a logic of peace and war that omitted almost entirely a “logic of law.”101 The terms 
of the debate were thus limited to a false dichotomy based on a limited perception 
92  “Redressing the wrongs committed through human rights violations is not only a legal obli-
gation and a moral imperative imposed on governments. It also makes good political sense in 
the transition from dictatorship to democracy. In fact, the pursuit of retrospective justice is an 
urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be 
established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each 
human person.” Méndez, supra note 16, at 1. 
93 Bassiouni, supra note 43, at 12; see also Dugard, supra note 20, at 285 (“Restoration of fidelity to 
the law is essential in a society which has been subjected to inhumanity in the name of the law.”).
94 Méndez, supra note 16, at 1.
95 Id.
96 Rome Statute, supra note 85, pmbl.
97 See Newman, supra note 87, at 316. 
98 Dugard, supra note 20, at 287.
99 Garth Meintjes & Juan E. Méndez, Reconciling Amnesties with Universal Jurisdiction, 2 Int’l L.F. 
76, 76–77 (2000). William Schabas contends that the experience of Sierra Leone suggests that 
combatants do not necessarily need an amnesty to come forward, and some rebels will never be 
enticed to testify even with the promise of amnesty. William A. Schabas, Amnesty, the Sierra Leone 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. 
& Pol’y 145, 152–53 (2004).
100 See Jennifer L. Balint, The Place of Law in Addressing Internal Regime Conflicts, Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Autumn 1996, at 103, 104–05.
101 See Méndez, supra note 16, at 7–8.
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of reality. As Teitel states: “The observation that amnesty practices are often de fac-
to associated with transitions is somehow turned into a normative statement about 
the relation of exercises of mercy to the liberal rule of law.”102 
In other words, because amnesty was what most national politicians opted 
for, it was assumed this was the only acceptable way to establish peace and the 
rule of law after years of lawlessness and widespread human rights abuses. State 
practice seemed to demonstrate that amnesties were not prohibited by interna-
tional law.103 Méndez recognizes, however, that until recently, many of these po-
liticians could not count on “a stronger voice of support from the international 
community for the efforts [to prosecute].”104 
Because human rights treaties are generally silent on the duty to guarantee 
criminal prosecutions,105 they were once assumed to trigger state liability only where a 
state failed to protect the rights of individuals under its jurisdictional control. Liabili-
ty, in turn, usually led to a declaratory judgment and sometimes to compensation and 
orders for reform.106 As the truth v. justice debate began to take hold, however, human 
rights law evolved to include criminal prosecutions. One can see this influence, in par-
ticular, in the Inter-American System of Human Rights and its role in expanding in-
ternational human rights obligations.107 The Inter-American System traces it origins 
to the 1948 creation of the Organization of American States (OAS), an international 
organization comprised of member states from North, Central, and South Ameri-
ca.108 In 1959, the OAS established the IACHR to monitor and report on the human 
rights situations in member countries.109 Ten years later, in 1969, the OAS created the 
American Convention on Human Rights.110 When the American Convention entered 
into force in 1978, the IACtHR became the enforcement body for the treaty, with 
102 Teitel, supra note 1, at 55. 
103 Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 63 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 339, 342–44 (2006) (arguing that state practice does not support the ban on amnesties).
104 Méndez, supra note 74, at 272. 
105 Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute 
Human Rights Crimes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 41, 48. 
106 See Lisa J. Laplante, Bringing Effective Remedies Home: The Inter-American Human Rights System, 
Reparations, and the Duty of Prevention, 22 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 347, 350 (2004).
107 For a more detailed account of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, see Jo M. Pasqua-
lucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2–7 (2003); Jo 
M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-
American Human Rights System, 12 B.U. Int’l L.J. 321, 361–64 (1994); Brian D. Tittemore, Ending 
Impunity in the Americas: The Role of the Inter-American Human Rights System in Advancing Accountabil-
ity for Serious Crimes Under International Law, 12 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 429 (2006).
108 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the Inter-American System, see Thomas Buergen-
thal, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials 37–44 (4th ed. 1995); Tom 
Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime: No Longer a Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox, in The 
Inter-American System of Human Rights 31 (David J. Harris & Stephen Livingstone eds., 1998).
109 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. G.A. Res. 447, Inter-
Am C.H.R., 9th Sess., OAS/Ser.L/V/I.4, rev. 8 (Oct. 1979), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Basicos/English/Basic17.Statute%20of%20the%20Commission.htm
110 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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contentious jurisdiction to issue binding decisions involving human rights violations 
by member states.111 
Significantly, the development of the Inter-American System coincided 
with the political transitions in Latin America discussed above in Part I. The Inter-
-American System generally took a hard stand against prior oppressive regimes. In 
the mid-1980s, however, the IACHR displayed caution regarding the obligations 
of “recent democracies” to investigate and initiate prosecutions of human rights 
violations of previous governments, stating that an international body could only 
make “minimal” contributions to the “sensitive and extremely delicate issue” of 
whether recent democracies should prosecute past abuses.112 Undoubtedly, the 
IACHR’s hesitation reflected the relative youth of the human rights system and 
the lack of a solidified legal framework to support a more definitive position on 
the duty to investigate and prosecute human rights crimes.113 However, the IA-
CHR began to take a consistent position on the duty to prosecute once the IAC-
tHR issued a landmark decision on the matter in the Velásquez Rodríguez case in 
1988.114 There, the IACtHR held that state parties have a duty to “ensure” the 
enumerated rights of the Convention, which, in turn 
implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public 
power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring 
the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of 
this obligation, the States must prevent, investigate and punish any 
violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, 
if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide com-
pensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation.115
111 See Victor Rodríquez Rescia & Marc David Seitles, The Development of the Inter-American Hu-
man Rights System: A Historical Perspective and a Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 
593, 608–19 (2000) (providing a historical overview of the development of the IACtHR).
112 Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights [IACHR], Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights 1985–1986, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68, doc. 8, rev. 1, at ch. V (Sept. 26, 1986), avail-
able at http://iachr.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.5.htm [hereinafter 1985–1986 Annual Report]. 
The Commission thus found that the response “must come from the national sectors which are 
themselves affected, and the urgent need for national reconciliation and social pacification must 
be reconciled with the ineluctable exigencies of an understanding of the truth and of justice.” Id. 
113 See Scharf, supra note 105, at 51 (discussing how the evolution of the human rights normative 
framework would eventually lead to a change in the IACHR’s position).
114 Velásquez Rodríguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
115 Id. ¶ 166 (emphasis added). Several scholars argue that the Velásquez Rodríguez decision should not 
be read too broadly because the Court did not order criminal prosecutions in that particular case. See 
Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 
Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 197, 210 (questioning if this holding is “iron clad” be-
cause the Court did not order criminal investigations in that case); Scharf, supra note 105, at 50–51 
(arguing that the Court’s ruling is not an absolute requirement because it did not order criminal 
investigations at the reparation stage); Trumbull, supra note 43, at 298–99 (adopting the view that 
the failure to order prosecution diminishes the weight of the case). However, the IACtHR repeatedly 
refers to this general holding in subsequent cases in which it does order criminal investigations, thus 
suggesting that the interpretation of these scholars may not be accurate. See Fernando Felipe Basch, 
The Doctrine of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Regarding States’ Duty to Punish Human Rights 
Violations and its Dangers, 23 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 195, 196–203 (2007).
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Thus, if a state fails to investigate, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of 
human rights violations, it becomes liable.116 Moving forward, the IACHR then 
consistently began to question the appropriateness of amnesties in Latin Ameri-
can political transitions through its reports on individual cases as well as through 
its annual and country reports.117 The Commission took this position even when 
countries had created a truth commission, stating that these investigations and 
payments of compensation were “not enough.”118
In this way, the IACHR became one of the first international human rights 
monitoring bodies to find amnesty laws contrary to basic human rights princi-
ples.119 Yet, because the IACHR’s decisions are not binding, states often respon-
ded by either ignoring its recommendation, or providing the classic argument that 
the need to balance peace with justice justified the laws.120 Nevertheless, these 
Inter-American System decisions helped build a bridge between the evolving field 
of international criminal justice and human rights law by recognizing that the 
principle of individual criminal responsibility is fundamental to the punishment 
116 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Viola-
tions in International Law, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 449, 513 (1990). The European Court of Human Rights 
arrived at this same conclusion in Kurt v. Turkey, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1152 (1998), in which it 
held that states have a duty to investigate, prosecute, and punish human rights violations. 
117 See, e.g., Garay Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 105 (1996); Consuelo v. Argentina, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 
10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14 ¶ 50 
(1992–93) (concluding that amnesty laws violate the judicial guarantees embodied in Articles 
8 and 25 of the American Convention); Mendoza v. Uruguay, Cases 10.029, 10.036, 10.145, 
10.305, 10.372, 10.373, 10.374, 10.375, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.83, doc. 14 ¶ 54 (1992–93); Massacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Inter-Am. 
C.H.R., Report No. 26/92, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 14, at 83 (1992–93) (declaring that amnesty 
laws in El Salvador contravene the American Convention); IACHR, Report on the Situation of Hu-
man Rights in Peru, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, doc. 31 (Mar. 12, 1993) (“One element that has been par-
ticularly disturbing to the Commission is that up until 1990, no member of the security forces 
had been tried and punished for involvement in human rights violations.”), available at http://
iachr.org/countryrep/Peru93eng/background.htm#f.%20Impunity; 1985–1986 Annual Report, 
supra note 112, ch. IV, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/85.86eng/chap.4.htm (ad-
dressing political transitions in the region and attempting to strike a balance between peace and 
the state’s obligation to investigate).
118 Garay Hermosilla, Case 10.843, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 36/96, ¶ 77.
119 See Canton, supra note 39, at 170–71 (viewing the IACHR’s decisions as among the first to 
reject amnesty laws). But see Robert O. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and 
Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 St. Mary’s L.J. 857, 865–70 (1995) (arguing that the IA-
CHR did outright condemn amnesties but left open that if they adhered to certain requirements 
they would be acceptable). The United Nations has also issued strong opinions on blanket 
amnesties. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (July 25, 1996) 
(commenting on Peruvian amnesty law); UNHRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, ¶ 153, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46 (Apr. 5, 1995) 
(stating that Argentina’s blanket amnesty laws are inconsistent with the International Cov-
enant of Political and Civil Rights and expressing concern that these laws may create an “atmo-
sphere of impunity” and violate victims’ rights to redress); Rodríguez v. Uruguay, Commc’n No. 
322/1988, Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 ¶ 12.2 (Aug. 9, 1994) 
(holding that Uruguay’s amnesty laws impaired the right to an adequate remedy).
120 See Canton, supra note 39, at 177.
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of serious human rights crimes.121 Essentially, a human rights violation not only 
triggered state responsibility, but could also constitute an international crime.122 
States cannot be brought to criminal trials for human rights violations, but the 
individuals who make up the state apparatus can.123 This development directly 
challenged the unconditional prerogative of the sovereign to decide matters of 
criminal jurisdiction.124 The choice of amnesty no longer depended solely on in-
ternal political considerations and “elite preferences” because legal rules now tied 
the hands of politicians in regime changes.125 
The rights of victim-survivors, such as the “right to truth” and the “right 
to an effective remedy” (which includes criminal investigations and prosecutions) 
now factor into the truth v. justice balancing equation.126 Furthermore, the denial 
of these rights by a state will trigger new violations.127 Thus, it is now understood 
that the state not only has a duty to pursue criminal prosecutions, but also a duty 
to uphold a victim’s right to a remedy.128
3.3 Current affairs: qualified amnesties
Despite the impressive inroads paved by the converging paths of interna-
tional criminal law and international human rights, the resilience of amnesty re-
mains. A majority of scholars and practitioners continue to defend the legitimacy 
121 See Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, In Search of Coherent Jurisprudence for International Crim-
inal Law: Correlating Universal Human Responsibilities with Universal Human Rights, 29 Suffolk 
Transnat’l L. Rev. 157, 204–06 (2006) (examining the overlap and connection between interna-
tional criminal law and human rights).
122 See Lyal S. Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights 
Violations 20, 50 (1992); Henrard, supra note 78, at 605–09 (discussing the concept of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for international crimes).
123 Joyner, supra note 20, at 607–08.
124 See Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of 
Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 Eur. J. Int’l L. 2, 11–12 (1998).
125 See David Pion-Berlin, To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American South-
ern Cone, in 1 Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes, supra 
note 44, at 82, 82–84, 100; see also Méndez, supra note 16, at 3–8; Pasqualucci, supra note 107, at 
345 (referring to the historical deference to national decisions to implement amnesty). 
126 See Raquel Aldana-Pindell, An Emerging Universality of Justiciable Victims’ Rights in the Criminal 
Process to Curtail Impunity for State-Sponsored Crimes, 26 Hum. Rts. Q. 605, 622–27 (2004) (ex-
ploring how criminal prosecutions are included as part of the right to remedy enjoyed by victims 
in the Inter-American System); Pasqualucci, supra note 107, at 349–59 (discussing the legal 
duty to ensure human rights by providing an “effective remedy” as recognized by the American 
Convention); Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Out of the Crooked Timber of Humanity: The Conflict Between 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and International Human Rights Norms Regarding 
“Effective Remedies,” 26 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 231–54 (2003) (providing an over-
view of the right to a remedy in international law).
127 See Aldana-Pindell, supra note 126, at 611. See generally Dinah Shelton, Remedies in Inter-
national Human Rights Law 113–43 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the state obligation to repair 
human rights violations). 
128 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 116, at 474–89. This general line of thinking originated with the 
Orentlicher-Nino debate. See supra note 44 (discussing the Orentlicher-Nino debate). This view 
was eventually adopted by the IACtHR. See Villagrán Morales v. Guatemala, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 77, ¶ 99 (May 26, 2001) (holding that the duty to prosecute is separate from 
a state’s duty to make reparations).
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of amnesties, although now in legal terms rather than practical and political ones. 
One sees this trend in a new line of scholarship seeking to establish guidelines, 
tests, and parameters for “legitimate” amnesties.129 Thus, an inverse relation be-
tween international legal parameters and amnesties has emerged. As the legal 
rules regarding transitional justice have expanded, the breadth of amnesty provi-
sions has been reduced. Consensus now rejects blanket amnesties barring all types 
of investigations.130 The question is now: “What type of amnesty is acceptable in 
a given situation?”131 
Part of the answer to this remaining question revolves around the paradox 
of legality in transitional justice settings: the rule of law depends on strictly ob-
serving issues of legality while putting on trial those who forsake the rule of law. 
Prosecutors in criminal trials must struggle to observe restrictions such as nullem 
crimen sin lege, which protects against ex post facto justice and punishment for 
acts not criminalized at the time of commission.132 To counter this problem, it is 
now generally accepted that amnesties cannot be applied where treaties obligate 
states to prosecute or where customary law may be interpreted to compel pro-
secution.133 Amnesties are unlawful for war crimes and treaty crimes, which are 
explicitly enumerated in the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and 
the Torture Convention. Each of these conventions encapsulates the doctrine of 
aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute).134 Recently, a new line of argument 
129 See, e.g., Burke-White, supra note 75, at 468 (proposing that liberal international law theory 
could be used to accommodate the preferences of individuals and social actors in determining 
the validity of amnesty); Henrard, supra note 78, at 645–48 (discussing qualified amnesties 
that include selective prosecution); Newman, supra note 87, at 306–16 (exploring the accepted 
limits of amnesties); Ronald C. Slye, The Cambodian Amnesties: Beneficiaries and the Temporal Reach 
of Amnesties for Gross Violation of Human Rights, 22 Wis. Int’l L.J. 99, 121 (2004) (suggesting that 
the decision regarding who should be protected by amnesty and for how long will influence the 
legitimacy of an amnesty); Slye, supra note 5, at 239–47 (proposing situations when amnesties 
may be legitimate, including “compromise,” “corrective,” and “accountable” amnesties); Jack 
Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International 
Justice, Int’l Security, Winter 2003/04, at 5, 7 (arguing that the “logic of consequences” should 
shape “strategies of justice”); Trumbull, supra note 43, at 319–26 (proposing a balancing test 
using the criteria of process, substance, and domestic and international circumstances to deter-
mine when amnesties are appropriate). 
130 See Slye, supra note 5, at 191 (discussing the limits of blanket amnesties and the need for 
states to take action to address the past). 
131 See Young, supra note 4, at 239 (presenting a legal framework to advise states on the proper 
scope of amnesty).
132 For a discussion of the concern about ex post facto issues in international criminal law, 
see Mark R. Von Sternberg, A Comparison of the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: 
Universal Jurisdiction and the “Elementary Dictates of Humanity,” 22 Brook J. Int’l L. 111, 131–32 
(1996). 
133 See Cassel, supra note 115, at 207–21 (outlining the Inter-American System treaty law that 
specifically requires prosecution); Trumbull, supra note 43, at 287–91 (outlining the treaty and 
customary law bases for barring amnesty).
134 For a discussion of the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare and the offenses to which it gener-
ally applies, see M. Cherif Bassiouni & Edward M. Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to 
Extradite or Prosecute in International Law 3 (1995). On the treaty-based grounds for barring 
amnesty, see Joyner, supra note 20, at 597–607 and Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Sources in International 
Treaties of an Obligation to Investigate, Prosecute, and Provide Redress, in Impunity and Human Rights 
in International Law and Practice, supra note 25, at 24, 25–26 (discussing the rationales of aut 
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includes crimes against humanity among those for which amnesty is unavailable, 
even though crimes against humanity are not codified in any formal convention 
but rather are a part of customary international law.135 Crimes that are part of 
customary international law that also reach the level of jus cogens come with the 
corresponding obligation to prosecute as an obligation ergo omnes.136
More recent examples of political transitions, even those in Latin America, 
have begun to demonstrate the new consensus that blanket amnesties are no longer 
permissible, further evidencing the growing restraint placed on national politics by 
international law. The direct impact of an emerging legal framework on amnesties is 
achieved through state practice as “state officials believe that they are under a legal 
obligation to hold criminals accountable, in some way, for their actions.”137 States 
have thus begun to draft amnesty laws in compliance with international obliga-
tions.138 Although some domestic courts ruled inconsistently on the permissibility 
of amnesties, those that recognized and incorporated international law tended to 
rule against their legality.139 Writing in 1998, Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Lauren Gib-
son analyzed lower court decisions on amnesty laws in Chile, El Salvador, Guatema-
la, Honduras, Peru, South Africa, Argentina, and Hungary and concluded that “the 
trend has been from broader to more tailored, from sweeping to qualified, from laws 
with no reference to international law to those which explicitly try to stay within 
its strictures.”140 They credit this trend to the “growing importance of a discourse 
about impunity and accountability on an international level.”141
Despite this evident evolution in state practice, a hard and fast contingent 
continues to advocate that some amnesties should remain in the “toolbox of con-
flict resolution” because of their usefulness for peacemaking.142 Notwithstanding 
the breadth of academic writing to the contrary, one commentator has also obser-
ved that amnesties may not be clearly restricted by emerging international legal 
dedere aut judicare). In 2000, the UN Secretary-General adopted the position that amnesties 
could not be granted for international crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, or 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶ 22, delivered to the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000); see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secre-
tary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 64(c), 
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (rejecting amnesties for 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). But see Scharf, supra note 105, at 360–63 
(arguing that the duty to prosecute is only required by treaty and not by customary law).
135 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 457, 475 (1994); M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens 
and Obligatio Erga Omnes, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1996, at 63 (arguing that states 
have an obligation to prosecute for inderogable rights). 
136 See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 116, at 489–505 (discussing the customary law duty to pros-
ecute).
137 Trumbull, supra note 43, at 301.
138 See Lynn Berat, South Africa: Negotiating Change?, in Impunity and Human Rights in Interna-
tional Law and Practice, supra note 25, at 267, 280 (discussing South Africa’s “rejection of a 
blanket amnesty and declared intent to abide by international law”).
139 Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 31, at 870.
140 Id. at 884.
141 Id.; see also Robert E. Lutz, A Piece of Peace: The Human Rights Accord and the Guatemalan Peace 
Process, 2 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 183 (1995).
142 See Schabas, supra note 99, at 165–66.
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rules: “Despite the growing tension between the development of international 
criminal laws and institutions on the one hand, and state practice embracing 
amnesties on the other, there is surprisingly little international law that directly 
addresses the legitimacy of amnesties.”143 
3.4 Calls for clarity: the uncertain future of amnesties in human 
rights protection
Despite recent encroachments upon the validity of amnesties, the status of 
an outright prohibition on amnesties remains unclear. At question is whether am-
nesties may be applied to crimes that constitute serious human rights violations, 
but do not fall into the category of treaty crimes, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity. Some argue that “[w]hile international human rights groups, following 
human rights interpretations of international criminal law, have been enthusiastic 
about a complete end to amnesties, there is room for substantial ongoing legal and 
philosophical analysis of the questions at stake.”144 
Since there is no explicit ban on all amnesties at the moment, limits must be 
judicially prescribed.145 In this vein, Michael Scharf in 1996 pointed out, “Once 
it is recognized that there is a gap in the international law requiring prosecution, 
two approaches are possible: one is to exploit the gap, the other is to attempt to 
fill it.”146 Given the risk of the former, advocates now eagerly wait for an inter-
national authority to fill it. Charles Trumbull observes that given the deadlock 
among scholars, “the legality of amnesties for perpetrators of serious crimes under 
international law is in a state of transition and considerable uncertainty.”147 He 
then writes: “The need for the international community to reach consensus on 
the validity of amnesties has become more acute in light of the controversial am-
nesties recently adopted by several countries.”148
4 Peru: legalizing impunity through amnesty
Peru represents a new stage in the development of the transitional justice 
paradigm. In its endeavor to address the past without providing impunity, it has 
included criminal justice in its transitional process from the beginning. Peru has 
143 Slye, supra note 5, at 179.
144 Newman, supra note 87, at 315.
145 See Young, supra note 4, at 232 (“No treaty provisions specifically prohibit amnesty.”).
146 Scharf, supra note 105, at 61.
147 Trumbull, supra note 43, at 285.
148 Id. at 286. There has been an attempt to create “soft law” through a consensus of academ-
ics, specifically by the drafting of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in 2001. 
Princeton Univ. Program in Law & Pub. Affairs, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
(2001), reprinted in Universal Jurisdiction 21 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004) [hereinafter Princ-
eton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction]. After extensive debate, however, the scholars were not 
able to agree on a per se rule regarding the legality of amnesty, deciding instead that “[a]mnes-
ties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to provide accountability for serious 
crimes under international law.” Trumbull, supra note 43, at 298 (quoting Princeton Principles 
on Universal Jurisdiction, supra, princ. 7).
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set a new trend of state practice by specifically rejecting amnesty laws in its do-
mestic political transition, and in doing so has helped resolve the pending ques-
tion on the status of amnesties. It is important to contextualize any analysis of 
Peru’s legal experience by first understanding its story—how it fell into authorita-
rianism and finally found its way out. Peru’s unique history has been significan-
tly influenced by the Inter-American System of Human Rights, which became a 
great ally of the local human rights movement prior to the country’s transition. A 
symbiotic national-international relationship, which continues today, has ensured 
that, above all else, Peru fulfills its duty to protect and respect the right to justice. 
This collaboration of sorts began over a decade ago during the height of 
Fujimori’s authoritarian regime. Local victim-survivors and their advocates made 
“good use” of the international system to influence and support the formation 
of the TRC and the criminal trials that soon followed.149 Ultimately, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, the investigations and consequent rulings of the 
IACHR and the IACtHR set the terms for Peru’s approach to transitional justice, 
which fully embraced the principle of criminal justice. 
4.1 In the name of national security
Perhaps one of the Inter-American System’s greatest contributions to Peru’s 
national criminal justice experience was its condemnation of Fujimori’s regime 
through a series of cases submitted throughout the 1990s. These cases reached 
the Inter-American System because of the wholly ineffective recourse provided 
by the Peruvian domestic legal system.150 Among these, the Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta cases would particularly impact the criminal justice aspect of Peru’s tran-
sitional justice experience.151 Both cases revolved around an undercover death 
squad—a centerpiece of Fujimori’s national security apparatus. 
Fujimori won the 1990 presidential election as a political unknown.152 Over 
the following years, with the help of his right hand advisor Vladimir Montesinos, 
he took carefully calculated steps to gain steadily almost absolute executive po-
wer, justifying his newfound authority under the guise of fighting terrorism.153 
The previous administration of Alan García (1985–90) left a country devastated 
by both economic collapse154 and a ten-year internal armed conflict with insur-
149 Lisa J. Laplante, Entwined Paths to Justice: The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Peru-
vian Truth Commission, in Paths to International Justice: Social and Legal Perspectives 216, 237 
(Marie-Bénédicte Dembour & Tobias Kelly eds., 2007). 
150 See id. at 219.
151 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(a) (Mar. 14, 2001); La 
Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(18) (Nov. 29, 2006).  For further 
discussion of these cases, see infra Part V. 
152 Catherine M. Conaghan, Fujimori’s Peru: Deception in the Public Sphere 15–18 (2005) (giv-
ing a historical account of the 1990 Peruvian elections and Fujimori’s candidacy).
153 Sally Bowen & Jane Holligan, El Espía Imperfecto: La Telaraña Siniestra de Vladimiro Mon-
tesinos (2003) (offering a full account of the political, often illegal, influence of Montesinos on 
Fujimori). 
154 See Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Peru’s Presidential Coup, 4 J. Democracy 28, 29 (1993) (describing 
how García’s policies led to spiraling foreign debt, an inflation rate that reached a rate of seven 
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gent groups including the Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path (PCP-SL).155 
Fujimori capitalized on the deep unease and fear that saturated Peruvian society 
as a result of these circumstances by taking drastic measures to promote his free 
market economic plan and clamp down on political opponents.156 With the sup-
port of the armed forces, Fujimori conducted an autogolpe (self-coup) on April 5, 
1992, in which he shut down the bicameral Congress, dismantled the judiciary, 
and suspended the national constitution.157 To assure enforcement of his new 
authoritarian regime, he hand picked General Nicolás De Bari Hermoza-Ríos to 
be the Commander General of the Army and Head of the Joint Command158 and 
gave the executive branch direct control over the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional 
(SIN) by appointing Montesinos as its de facto executive chief.159 SIN, in turn, 
created the death squad called El Grupo Colina (Colina).160 
Colina consisted of thirty-two men and six women and worked clandestine-
ly in collaboration with the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces (SIE) under 
the direction of Army Majors Santiago Martín Rivas and Carlos Eliseo Pichilin-
güe-Guevara.161 This clandestine group was formed to carry out “a State policy 
consisting in the identification, control and elimination of those persons suspec-
ted of belonging to insurgent groups or who [were] opposed to the government 
of former President Alberto Fujimori. It operated through the implementation 
of systematic indiscriminate extra-legal executions, selective killings, forced disa-
thousand percent and a gross national product drop of twelve percent).
155 A few years later, the insurgent group Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement joined the 
internal armed conflict. For more background on Peru’s internal armed conflict, see generally 
Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru (Robin Kirk trans., 
Univ. N.C. Press 1999) (1990) (offering a journalist’s historical account of the strategy, actions, 
and challenges of the state and rebels during the war); Orin Starn, Maoism in the Andes: The 
Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History, 27 J. Latin Am. Stud. 399 (1995). 
156 See Jo-Marie Burt, “Quien habla es terrorista”: The Political Use of Fear in Fujimori’s Peru, 41 Latin 
Am. Res. Rev. 32, 47 (2006) [hereinafter Burt, Quien habla]; Jo-Marie Burt, State Making Against 
Democracy: The Case of Fujimori’s Peru, in Politics in the Andes: Identity, Conflict, Reform 247, 
255–57 (Jo-Marie Burt & Philip Mauceri eds., 2004) (describing the reconstitution of authori-
tarianism in response to political violence and high inflation in Peru).
157 Maxwell A. Cameron, Latin American Autogolpes: Dangerous Undertows in the Third Wave of Democ-
ratization, 19 Third World Q. 219, 224, 228–29 (1998) [hereinafter Cameron, Autogolpes]; Max-
well A. Cameron, Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia, 9 J. Democracy 125, 127 (1998) [herein-
after Cameron, Self-Coups]. See generally Charles D. Kenney, Fujimori’s Coup and the Breakdown of 
Democracy in Latin America (2004) (providing a comprehensive analysis of Fujimori’s self-coup). 
158 See Cameron, Autogolpes, supra note 157, at 236. 
159 General Julio Salazar-Monroe was SIN’s official director. Until this time, the SIN had with-
ered under civilian rule and was a small, underfunded organization. Fujimori reinvigorated the 
office and it grew to employ thousands of agents and became “an indispensable part of the gov-
ernment’s political machine and an instrument for isolating, discrediting, and spying on oppo-
nents.” Roger Atwood, Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Leguía to Fujimori, 21 
SAIS Rev. Int’l Aff. 155, 171 (2001). The power of the intelligence services was also increased 
by the appointment of Nélida Colán as attorney general. Colán “did little to defend citizens’ 
rights” in the wake of major abuses by the intelligence services and removed several judges who 
displayed an independent streak. Cameron, Self-Coups, supra note 157, at 130.
160 See Cameron, Self-Coups, supra note 157, at 127.
161 Efraín Rúa, El Crimen de la Cantuta: La Desaparición y Muerte de un Profesor y Nueve Es-
tudiantes que Estremeció al País 119–20, 130 (2005).
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ppearances and tortures.”162 Although the leader of Shining Path was captured on 
September 12, 1992, and the insurgent movement and violence declined, Colina 
continued to operate under the justification of heightened national security due 
to alleged terrorism.163 As Peru’s “political police,” the death squad would go on 
to carry out some of Peru’s most notorious massacres, including those at Barrios 
Altos and La Cantuta.164
4.2 The massacres of barrios altos and la cantuta
 
Peruvian journalist and author Efraín Rúa describes the Barrios Altos mas-
sacre as Colina’s “consecrating act”—one that would be a rite of passage for a small 
group of army officers who would go on to conduct some of Peru’s most ruthless 
tragedies.165 This nefarious story began on November 3, 1991, when neighbors of 
the poor Lima neighborhood of Barrios Altos held a pollada (fundraiser) to help 
replace faulty drains and piping that were making their children sick.166 Around 
11:30 p.m., two vehicles with sirens pulled up to the dwelling and six armed, 
masked men descended upon the party.167 For the next few minutes, the men fired 
with silencers on the crowd, killing fifteen people, including an eight-year-old 
child who had run to his father’s aid pleading for the killers to have mercy.168 Four 
other people were seriously wounded, including one man who was paralyzed after 
being hit with twenty-seven bullets.169 Information came forward that the Barrios 
Altos massacre was conducted by a government affiliated death squad as part of 
162 La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(18) (Nov. 29, 2006). 
The IACtHR also referred to the findings of the Peruvian TRC: “The so-called ‘Colina Group,’ 
composed of members of the Army, is probably one of the groups specialized in forced disap-
pearances and arbitrary executions most widely known . . . . In 1991, top military and political 
authorities ordered the officers of the intelligence operations division (AIO) belonging to the 
Servicio de Inteligencia del Ejército (SIE) (Army Intelligence Service) to create a squad reporting 
to the structure of the Dirección de Inteligencia del Ejército Peruano (DINTE), which was then 
known as ‘Colina Detachment.’ This group was in charge of operations especially designed to 
eliminate alleged subversives, sympathizers or collaborators of subversive organizations.” Id. 
¶ 80(18) n.25 (quoting 6 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth & Reconciliation Com-
mission], Informe Final [Final Report] 154 (2003) (Peru), available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/
ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VI/SECCION%20CUARTA-Crimenes%20y%20violaciones%20DDHH/
FINAL-AGOSTO/1.3.%20EJECUCIONES%20ARBITRARIAS.pdf ).
163 See Audrey Kurth Cronin, How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups, Int’l 
Security, Summer 2006, at 7, 20 (arguing that the capture of Abimael Guzman led to the demise 
of Shining Path).
164 Burt, Quien habla, supra note 156, at 47–48. Colina was named after José Pablo Colina Gaige, 
a secret intelligence agent who had infiltrated PCP-SL and was killed in a “friendly fire” incident 
in 1984 by a state agent who had been ordered not to bring back detainees. Rúa, supra note 
161, at 129.
165 Rúa, supra note 161, at 129.
166 Id. at 123.
167 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(a) (Mar. 14, 2001). It was 
eventually revealed that the trucks had belonged to Fujimori’s brother and the Vice-Minister of 
the Interior who later reported the trucks stolen. Rúa, supra note 161, at 127.
168 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(b); Rúa, supra note 161, at 125.
169 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(b); Rúa, supra note 161, at 125.
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an anti-terrorism campaign.170 On November 27, 1991, the Peruvian Congress 
created a committee to investigate the Barrios Altos massacre, but its efforts were 
thwarted by Fujimori’s self-coup that dissolved Congress in April 1992.171 The 
issue of justice for Barrios Altos would not be revisited for another three years.
The next notorious act attributed to Colina allegedly occurred as revenge 
for one of Lima’s worst acts of terrorism. On July 16, 1992, one hundred days 
after Fujimori’s self-coup, two young men pulled a car up to a plaza in the center 
of the urban town Miraflores, one of the upper class boroughs of Lima. A security 
guard shot at them as they fled the scene. Seconds later, the trucks they had been 
driving exploded, destroying the surrounding Tarata apartment building, killing 
twenty-two people and seriously injuring two hundred more.172 The next day, 
SIN received information that the fleeing culprits arrived bleeding at La Cantuta, 
formally known as the Universidad Enrique Guzmán y Valle.173 Already, Peruvian 
universities suffered great tension because they were suspected of serving as fee-
ding ground for new PCP-SL recruits, and as a result military stations had been 
installed on many school grounds including La Cantuta.174 
On the day after the Tarata bombing, Colina members arrived at La Cantuta 
in the early morning hours, passing with the permission of the soldiers guarding 
the front entrance.175 They barged into the dorms, pulled sleeping students from 
their beds, hit and threatened them, took some into the yard, and eventually loa-
ded nine of them into their trucks.176 They also took Professor Hugo Muñoz-San-
chez from his home in a hood, locking his wife and little boy in the bathroom.177 
The nine students and Professor Muñoz-Sanchez were driven to a nearby arid 
stretch of land in the district of Cieneguilla called the “boca del diablo” (devil’s 
mouth),178 where they were executed by shots to the back of the head and then 
170 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(d). 
171 Id. ¶ 2(f).
172 Rúa, supra note 161, at 159.
173 Id. at 163.
174 The government had authorized the entry of the security forces to the universities through 
Decree-Law No. 726 of November 8, 1991. La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 162, ¶ 80(10) (Nov. 29, 2006). The IACtHR referred to the Peruvian TRC’s account 
of this situation: “At the beginning of 1991, the local TV released a video of a political-cultural 
ceremony held at ‘La Cantuta’ University that allowed speculating about the level of control 
that ‘Sendero Luminoso’ (Shinning Path [sic]) had in the University. On May 21, 1991, former 
President Alberto Fujimori visited the university causing the violent reaction of students that 
forced him to leave the campus, humiliated. The following day, military troops took control of 
the Universidad Mayor de San Marcos and of ‘La Cantuta’ University, and 56 students were ar-
rested. Among them there were three of the nine students that were subsequently subjected to 
extra-legal execution.” Id. (quoting 7 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth & Recon-
ciliation Commission], supra note 162, at 234, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/
TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustrativos-UIE/2.22.%20LA%20CANTUTA.pdf). 
175 See La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(12).
176 The abducted students were: Juan Mariños-Figueroa, Bertila Lozano-Torres, Roberto Teo-
doro-Espinoza, Marcelino Rosales-Cárdenas, Felipe Flores-Chipana, Luis Enrique Ortiz-Perea, 
Armando Amaro-Cóndor, Heráclides Pablo-Meza, and Dora Oyague-Fierro. Id. ¶ 80(15). 
177 Rúa, supra note 161, at 18.
178 Id. 
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buried.179 Some days later, Colina agents returned to burn and rebury the bodies 
in a new common grave in Huachipa.180 
 Over the following days and weeks, the families of the nine missing stu-
dents and one professor began to learn of the event through friends, family, and 
newspaper headlines, starting a search for justice that continues today.181 The 
families visited police stations, military barracks, and local municipalities, all of 
which denied knowledge of the events at La Cantuta. Antonia Pérez-Velásquez de 
Muñoz, wife of Hugo Muñoz-Sanchez, said it was as if “he had vanished off the 
face of the earth.”182 They were not deterred by death threats or the resistance of 
people who suspected their loved ones of being terrorists.183 The families, as well 
as the dean of La Cantuta, eventually filed three habeas corpus petitions, all of 
which were dismissed as groundless. The military, including Luis Salazar-Monroe 
and General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza-Ríos, denied knowledge of the attack and 
refused to provide information citing “national security reasons.”184 The families 
also filed criminal complaints in July and August of 1992.185 
 On April 2, 1993, while the families unsuccessfully sought a legal remedy, 
Henry Pease-García, a progressive Peruvian Congressman, received an anonymous 
document from an army faction calling itself the “León Dormido” (Sleeping Lion) 
identifying the masterminds of the La Cantuta disappearances.186 A congressional 
committee was formed to further investigate the case, but it faced considerable obs-
tacles, including the military’s refusal to testify. Even when General Hermoza-Ríos 
eventually appeared before the committee on April 20, 1993, he denied that the 
army participated in the disappearances and, upon leaving, read a statement to the 
press accusing the congressional members of working “in collusion with the terrorists” 
and participating in “the orchestration of a well-thought and planned campaign to 
impair the prestige and honor of the Peruvian Army.”187 The next day, military tanks 
circulated throughout the capital city of Lima and stationed near the Congress buil-
ding. General Hermoza-Ríos issued more statements regarding the “false” accusations 
constituting a systematic campaign to undermine the military’s ability to fight terro-
rism and forbade any officer from cooperating with the committee.188 
In May 1993, Peruvian General Rodolfo Robles Espinoza, Commander 
General of the Third Military Region, publicly declared that he had reliable in-
179 Id. at 169–74.
180 See La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 80(16), (31).
181 See id. ¶¶ 60(a)–(g), 61 (providing the testimonies of next of kin).
182 Id. ¶ 61(c).
183 See id. ¶ 60.
184 Id. ¶ 80(20)(ii)–(iii); see also Rúa, supra note 161, at 185–86.
185 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(20). Antonia Pérez-Velásquez 
de Muñoz reported the disappearance of her husband to the Provincial Criminal Prosecutor´s 
Office of the Tenth Prosecutor´s Office on July 21, 1992. Id. ¶ 80(21).
186 Id. ¶ 80(25). 
187 Id. ¶ 80(27); see also Rúa, supra note 161, at 205.
188 This military stand off finally came to a halt through international pressures, and Defense 
Minister Víctor Malca eventually brought the bravado display to a halt, but by then General 
Hermoza-Ríos had ordered a freeze on any testimony before the congressional committee. Rúa, 
supra note 161, at 206–12.
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formation that Colina was responsible for the La Cantuta murders, an act that 
forced him to go into exile in Argentina after thirty-seven years of service.189 Soon 
after, in July 1993, journalists of the local newspaper Sí received a hand-drawn 
map that claimed to point to the buried bodies of the La Cantuta victims and a 
note that provided minute details of the clandestine graves.190 This clue led to the 
discovery of the hidden graves and, under the supervision of prosecutor Victor 
Cubas-Villanueva, the recovery of burned bones and clothing, all recognized by 
the next of kin in attendance.191 Keys were also found which opened the dormi-
tory locker of one of the murdered students and the front door of another. This 
breakthrough led Congresswomen Gloria Helfer, who also worked on the special 
congressional committee, to remark: “The dead are talking, and they are saying 
the perpetrators are free and they are demanding justice.”192 
4.3 The pressure to prosecute and the battle of jurisdiction
In the quest to obtain justice through the courts, the families and their 
allies found the jurisdictional conflict between ordinary civilian criminal courts 
and military courts to be their greatest obstacle. For example, the Peruvian At-
torney General ordered prosecutors to begin investigations into the murders on 
August 6, 1992.193 The prosecutor’s office declined jurisdiction, however, because 
the same facts were already being reviewed by the War Chamber of the Supreme 
Council of Military Justice (SCMJ), a decision eventually affirmed on appeal.194 
Other ongoing challenges included reluctant or uncooperative civil judges and the 
political harassment and replacement of prosecutors.195 The military investigation 
opened in April 1993, but did not progress until the discovery of the clandestine 
graves, at which point the SCMJ Investigation Board admitted the complaint 
filed by the War Chamber Prosecutor.196 
 Rightly suspecting that the military’s co-option of the criminal investi-
gations was a subterfuge to halt justice, the families persisted with their civil 
claims. On December 15, 1993, they filed criminal complaints against Retired 
Army Captain Montesinos and Generals Hermoza-Ríos, Luis Pérez-Documet, Ju-
189 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(17); Rúa, supra note 161, at 
211–12.
190 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(30); Rúa, supra note 161, at 228.
191 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 80(30)–(31).
192 Rúa, supra note 161, at 238 (author’s translation).
193 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(23).
194 Id. ¶ 80(23).
195 See id. ¶ 136; Rúa, supra note 161, at 239.
196 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(44). “On July 7, 1993, in Case 
No. 157-V-93, the SCMJ Investigation Board extended inquiry proceedings against Brigade 
General Juan Rivero-Lazo, Cavalry Colonel Federico Augusto Navarro-Pérez, Maj. Santiago En-
rique Martín-Rivas, Maj. Carlos Pichilingüe-Guevara and Lt. Aquilino Portella-Nuñez and José 
Adolfo Velarde-Astete, on the grounds of the alleged commission of abuse of authority and 
crimes against life, body and health. On December 13, 1993, inquiry proceedings were extended 
against Infantry Lt. José Adolfo Valarde-Astete ‘to be held responsible for’ the offense of negli-
gence . . . .” Id. ¶ 80(43).
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lio Salazar-Monroe, and Juan Rivero-Lazo as the masterminds of the La Cantuta 
crimes.197 The same prosecutor who oversaw the exhumations of the clandestine 
graves, Cubas-Villanueva, also filed a criminal complaint, which included officers 
named in the SCMJ investigation, with a court in Lima on December 16, 1993.198 
The Lima court started proceedings the next day. The SCMJ then immediately 
challenged the ordinary court’s jurisdiction.199
 But for international pressure, the search for justice may have continued 
in this endless circle. The international community, however, made La Cantuta a 
cause célèbre and posed it as the final test of Fujimori’s pledge of democracy and 
human rights after his self-coup.200 Rising to the occasion made sense for Fujimori 
given his upcoming bid for reelection and his political need to unfreeze millions 
of dollars in U.S. aid, which was conditioned on “a satisfactory resolution” of the 
La Cantuta case.201 As would be later revealed later, he selected a group of officers 
to stand trial with the promise that they would later be pardoned and handsomely 
compensated for their sacrifice.202 But the jurisdiction question still awaited final 
resolution. In the new quest to showcase justice, the administration pushed for a 
conclusion. The Criminal Chamber of the Peruvian Supreme Court issued a de-
cision on the matter on February 3, 1994, but the decision was divided with two 
justices supporting the ordinary court jurisdiction and the other three supporting 
the military courts.203 A vote of at least four was needed to approve jurisdiction. 
In quick response, the Fujimori-backed Congress presented a bill on Febru-
ary 8, 1994, proposing that a conflict of jurisdiction issue be resolved by simple 
majority and secret ballot. The law was designed to be retroactive, thus allowing 
the previous three affirmative votes to count. The bill was approved the same day 
and signed into law by Fujimori the next day.204 With the issue of jurisdiction now 
settled, the military trials proceeded on February 11, 1994.205 The trials resulted 
in acquittals for some of the defendants on the more serious charges.206 Five offi-
cers, however, were convicted on several major counts, including forced disappea-
rances, and received prison terms of fifteen to twenty years.207 On May 3, 1994, 
the SCMJ affirmed the decision.208 The SCMJ War Chambers started proceedings 
against the alleged “intellectual perpetrators” of La Cantuta, including Army Ge-
197 Id. ¶ 80(45).
198 Id. ¶¶ 80(46)–(47). Cubas-Villanueva soon encountered threats as well as attempts by the 
same judiciary trying to undermine him with fabricated disciplinary charges. See id. ¶ 80(49).
199 Id. ¶ 80(48).
200 See James Brooke, Army Officers’ Trials to Test Democracy in Peru, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1994, at A3. 
201 Id. Rúa reports that the trials were first announced in the New York Times and not local news-
papers, evidencing their intent to please an international audience. Rúa, supra note 161, at 242. 
202 7 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth & Reconciliation Commission], supra note 
162, at 241–43, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20
Ilustrativos-UIE/2.22.%20LA%20CANTUTA.pdf; Ernesto Chávez, Grupo Colina Amenaza y Fu-
jimori los Amnistía, Crónica Viva (Oct. 3, 2007) (Peru), at http://www.cronicaviva.com.pe/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18976&Itemid=86.
203 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(50). 
204 Id. ¶ 80(51) (discussing Law No. 26,291). 
205 Id. ¶ 80(52).
206 See id. ¶ 80(54)(a)–(j).
207 See id. ¶ 80(54)(i)–(j).
208 See id. ¶ 80(55).
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neral Hermoza-Ríos, Brigade Army General Pérez-Documet, and Retired Army 
Captain Montesinos, on the grounds they committed serious crimes, including 
forced disappearance, but ultimately decided to dismiss the case on August 15, 
1994.209 The SCMJ Review Chamber affirmed this decision on August 18, 1994, 
and closed the case permanently for lack of evidence.210 
Fujimori’s hope that these convictions would persuade critics that justice 
had been done was not borne out. As foreshadowed by Lourdes Flores, an oppo-
sitional member of Congress: “This process is not going to be considered closed 
because the competence of the military courts was defined through an unconsti-
tutional law. Therefore, when democracy is fully recovered, it is very probable that 
either the Supreme Court or even political pressure will reopen this case.”211 Her 
prediction would come true, although not for another six years, and only after 
Fujimori managed to erode further the rule of law. 
4.4 A new presidential term and amnesty laws
Fujimori won reelection by a landslide in April 1995 despite accusations of 
corruption.212 Having seemingly laid to rest the scandal surrounding Colina and 
securing his continuation in office, Fujimori appeared to have guaranteed impu-
nity. Any complacency, however, would soon be challenged by public prosecutor 
Ana Cecilia Magallanes, who opened criminal investigations in April 1995 against 
five army officials, including General Julio Salazar-Monroe, the head of the Na-
tional Intelligence Service, for the massacre at Barrios Altos,213 Judge Antonia 
Saquicuray of the Sixteenth Criminal Court of Lima initiated a formal investiga-
tion on April 19, 1995, yet when she tried to summon the accused to take their 
statements, the SCMJ issued a resolution barring her request because it conflicted 
with the SCMJ’s jurisdiction.214 Regardless, Judge Saquicuray pursued the investi-
gation, and the military court filed a petition before the Supreme Court to resolve 
the jurisdictional issue. 215
The Supreme Court never had a chance to deliberate on the issue, ho-
wever, because Congress adopted Law No. 26,479 (the “Amnesty Law”) in the 
early morning hours of June 14, 1995.216 The next day the president immediately 
promulgated the law.217 The law granted amnesty to “all members of the security 
209 Id. ¶ 80(57). The military court did not accept the argument that the officers acted with the 
approval of high command. Rúa, supra note 161, at 264–65. 
210 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(57). 
211 Nathaniel C. Nash, 9 Peruvian Military Men Are Sentenced in Killings, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 
1994, at A6. 
212 See Conaghan, supra note 152, at 96–99 (describing the 1995 Peruvian elections). See generally 
Gregory D. Schmidt, Delegative Democracy in Peru? Fujimori’s 1995 Landslide and the Prospects for 
2000, 42 J. Interam. Stud. & World Aff. 99 (2000). 
213 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(g) (Mar. 14, 2001).
214 Id. ¶ 2(h).
215 Id. ¶ 2(i). 
216 Id. The law was passed without committee review or debate. See id. See generally Burke-White, 
supra note 75, at 485–89 (discussing the Peruvian amnesty law and legal challenges).
217 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(i). 
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forces and civilians who had been accused, investigated, prosecuted or convicted, 
or who were carrying out prison sentences, for human rights violations.”218 The 
practical result was that the La Cantuta convictions were immediately annulled, 
the eight detained members of Colina were released, and all other human rights 
investigations, including the Barrios Altos case, were barred.219 Despite this abso-
lute ban on criminal investigations, Judge Saquicuray decided the next day that 
Article 1 of Law No. 26,479 was not applicable to Barrios Altos because it viola-
ted the Constitution and Peru’s obligations under the American Convention.220 
The defense lawyers for the accused in Barrios Altos appealed.221 The Eleventh 
Criminal Chamber of the Lima Superior Court scheduled a hearing to review the 
law on July 3, 1995, but before the hearing could take place Congress adopted a 
second amnesty law which barred judicial review of Law No. 26,479 and made its 
application obligatory.222 The law also extended immunity to all military, police, 
or civilian officials who might be the subject of indictments for human rights 
violations committed between 1980 and 1995.223 In an about turn, the Eleventh 
Criminal Chamber of the Lima Superior Court overturned the lower court’s deci-
sion that the first amnesty law was unconstitutional and quashed the Barrios Altos 
investigation on July 14, 1995.224 It also declared that the court was barred from 
reviewing the law due to the principle of separation of powers and ordered an 
investigation of Judge Saquicuray.225 Eventually, the Tribunal Constitucional, Peru’s 
highest court, suggested in a 1997 opinion that the amnesty laws were unconsti-
tutional, but in subservience to the authoritarian regime avoided issuing a final 
sentence on the matter and declared that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits 
given that the second amnesty law barred judicial review.226 
On July 28, 1995, when Fujimori was sworn into office for the second time, he 
asked for a minute of silence for all the victims, and then addressed the nation: “We 
must pacify our hearts, and forget the past and honor the memory of all of our dece-
ased, because all of us, right or wrong, are Peruvians! The amnesty law is necessary to 
build peace, and so Peruvians must not look back but instead to the future.”227
218 Id.
219 See id.; La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 80(59)–(60) (Nov. 
29, 2006). 
220 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 2(k). The Peruvian Constitution 
requires judges not to apply “those laws that they consider contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution.” Id. 
221 Id. ¶ 2(l). 
222 Id. ¶ 2(m). 
223 Id.
224 Id. ¶ 2(n). 
225 Id; see also Susana Villarán de la Puente, Peru, in Victims Unsilenced: The Inter-American Hu-
man Rights System and Transitional Justice in Latin America, supra note 39, at 116 (providing 
the author’s first-hand account of the court decision). 
226 See Constitutional Court, Exp. No. 013-96-I/TC (Apr. 18 1997) (Peru); see also Roht-Arriaza 
& Gibson, supra note 31, at 878–79 (discussing the Peruvian Supreme Court’s rationale of 
“separation of powers” in declining jurisdiction).
227 Rúa, supra note 161, at 280. 
Lisa J. Laplante
92 EJJL                                                                        Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 59-116, Edição Especial 2012
4.5 The inter-american system of human rights and fujimori’s 
downfall
 Those who suffered under Fujimori’s regime were not ready to forget the 
experience so easily. Faced with domestic judicial remedies that were wholly ina-
dequate, the victim-survivors began to take their claims to the IACHR with the 
help of human rights defenders. The human rights lawyers of the National Co-
ordinator of Human Rights filed a petition against the government on June 30, 
1995, for the issuance of the amnesty laws that obstructed a full and fair criminal 
investigation and trial of those responsible for the Barrios Altos massacre.228 At 
that time, a petition for the La Cantuta massacre was already pending with the 
IACHR pursuant to a filing made on July 30, 1992, by Gisela Ortiz-Perea, Rosario 
Muñoz-Sánchez, Raida Cóndor, José Oyague, and Bitalia Barrueta de Pablo based 
on the same concern regarding the futility of internal remedies.229 
Indeed, a steady stream of petitions from Peruvians caught in Fujimori’s 
Machiavellian web began to flow through the doors of the IACHR, especially as 
local human rights organizations began to use this international forum to advance 
their local struggle.230 The IACHR, in turn, began to present the most emblema-
tic of these cases to the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR.231 Soon after 
Fujimori’s second election, the IACtHR issued landmark decisions concerning 
many of the abusive trademarks of Fujimori’s regime, including forced disappe-
arances, prison massacres, and the arbitrary and unjust imprisonment of people 
under the state’s antiterrorist legislation.232  
Fujimori’s government came under heightened scrutiny as the decisions sig-
naled a clear condemnation of its policies and practices for failing to uphold the 
American Convention. As already noted, Fujimori’s government worried about 
the international community’s opinion, in particular that of the United States, 
and thus it could not so easily ignore the international court. Peru thus began to 
adhere reluctantly and only partially to the Court’s orders. After the Court began 
directly to question the government’s national security laws, however, Fujimori 
228 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 4. The IACHR registered the case as 
No. 11.528 on August 28, 1995, and requested information from the state within ninety days. 
Subsequent petitions were submitted on behalf of the victims and next of kin over the following 
year, all of which were joined to the original petition. See id. ¶¶ 4–10.
229 See La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 5 (Nov. 29, 2006). The 
case was registered as No. 11.045 by the IACHR. Eventually other petitions filed by the human 
rights organization, Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos, would be joined to it, and a session on the 
admissibility of the case occurred on March 11, 1999. Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
230 For a fuller account of this history, see generally Laplante, supra note 149.
231 The Inter-American Commission filters cases to the Inter-American Court. Applicants do 
not have the right to bring a case directly to the IACtHR under the American Convention. See 
Pasqualucci, supra note 107, at 360–61.
232 See, e.g., Durand & Ugarte Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 68 (Aug. 16, 2000) 
(concerning the prison massacre at El Frontón); Cesti-Hurtado Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 56 (Sept. 29, 1999); Castillo-Páez Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 34 
(Nov. 3, 1997) (concerning the forced disappearance of a university student); Loayza-Tamayo 
Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 33 (Sept. 17, 1997) (dealing with arbitrary impris-
onment and torture under antiterrorism law).
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withdrew from the Court’s jurisdiction in July 1999, a decision declared invalid 
by the Court.233 This defiant act put Peru under greater international scrutiny and 
contributed to the cascade of events that would cause Fujimori’s downfall shortly 
after his fraudulent 2000 reelection.234
5 A new paradigm: peru’s political transition without amnesty
Soon after the 2000 Peruvian elections, Fujimori’s regime came to an 
abrupt end due to corruption scandals. Hundreds of videos were uncovered show-
ing Montesinos bribing the country’s powerful elites (including those in media, 
business, and military), forcing Fujimori to call for new elections in which he 
pledged not to run.235 In November 2000, before those elections took place, Fu-
jimori travelled to Japan, faxed his resignation, and proceeded to take refuge for 
five years despite Peru’s efforts to extradite him to stand trial for his abuses.236 
In this sudden political clearing, Peru initiated a process of transitional justice to 
address the human and institutional damage caused by the conflict. 
In the same month that Fujimori became a fugitive, the transitional govern-
ment led by Valentín Paniagua sought to legitimize itself by mending relations with 
the Inter-American System.237 The government began a massive sweep to prosecute 
the individuals caught in Montesinos and Fujimori’s intricate corruption scheme, 
and, as part of this new intiative, brought charges against the Supreme Court jus-
tices who dismissed the La Cantuta case for personal cover up and criminal asso-
ciation.238 Peru rejoined the contentious jurisdiction of the IACtHR and began to 
233 See Morse Tan, Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 33 Int’l J. Legal Info. 319, 322–25 (2005) (describing Fujimori’s attempt to withdraw 
from the IACtHR). For the Court’s rejection of this withdrawal, see also Ivcher-Bronstein Case, 
2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (Sept. 24, 1999). 
234 The legitimacy of Fujimori’s 2000 reelection was questioned even more so than his first 
reelection in 1995. In order to run for a third term, Fujimori solicited Congress to issue an inter-
pretation of the Peruvian Constitution that permitted a third term. The climate of the elections 
also included political repression which led to condemnation from international observers sent 
from the OAS. See Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report by the 
IACHR on the Situation of Human Rights in Peru (June 4, 2000), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/ 
Comunicados/English/2000/Press6-00.htm. See generally Andrew F. Cooper & Thomas Legler, 
The OAS in Peru: A Model for the Future?, 12 J. Democracy 123 (2001) (providing a comprehen-
sive narrative of the 2000 elections and discussing its legal flaws). For international press cover-
age, see, for example, Andres Oppenheimer, Watchdog Group May Condemn Peru Election, Miami 
Herald, Mar. 25, 2000, at A3. 
235 See generally John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru, 18 J. 
Econ. Persp. 69 (2004) (describing the events, including the secret videos, that led to Fujimori’s 
downfall).
236 John R. Hamilton, The Fall of Fujimori: A Diplomat’s Perspective, 30 Fletcher Foreign World Aff. 
191, 191 (2006). 
237 Laplante, supra note 149, at 222.
238 La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶ 80(71)–(74) (Nov. 29, 2006). 
For a general discussion of the corruption trials, see Nelly Calderón Navarro, Fighting Corruption: 
The Peruvian Experience, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 488 (2006) (describing the special criminal court 
created to try hundreds of Peruvians on charges of corruption).
Lisa J. Laplante
94 EJJL                                                                        Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 59-116, Edição Especial 2012
comply with its previous judgments.239 In February 2001, Peru sought to resolve a 
great number of the cases still being processed by the IACHR, including La Cantuta, 
through a “friendly settlement,” in which the state promised not only to pay repara-
tions to the victims and next of kin, but also to initiate investigations.240 The tran-
sitional government realized that, in addition to these cases, there were thousands 
more that could lead to new petitions. It thus sought a more comprehensive and 
administrative means of addressing them, namely by way of a truth commission.
In December 2001, the transitional government created the Inter-Institu-
tional Working Group, which ultimately led to the establishment of the TRC.241 
The Inter-Institutional Working Group envisioned that the TRC would address 
“events attributable to State agents, events attributable to individuals who acted 
with State agents’ consent, acquiescence or connivance, as well as those events 
that are attributable to subversive groups,” a focus eventually included in the 
mandate approved by executive decree.242 In committing to criminal justice, how-
ever, the transitional government faced the immediate challenge of Fujimori’s 
1995 amnesty laws. If future prosecution remained impossible, the TRC might 
fail to meet the expectations of victims. Moreover, if the amnesty laws forbade 
all types of investigation, the TRC’s investigations could also be thwarted by 
Fujimori’s supporters and the military because they still enjoyed substantial po-
wer. Aware that a domestic solution would be not be feasible in the short term, 
Peru looked to the Inter-American System for a resolution.
239 Resolución Legislativa No. 27,401, Diario Oficial El Peruano No. 197,465 (Jan. 19, 2001) 
(Peru) (abrogating Legislative Resolution No. 27,152).
240 A friendly settlement is an agreement between the parties to settle the case with-
out the Court deciding on its merits. Peru agreed to settle more than 165 cases, represent-
ing over half of its total cases then before the IACHR. See Joint Press Release, Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights, Meeting with Representatives of the Government of 
Peru (Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2001/Peru.htm; Org. 
of Am. States, Report of the Permanent Council on the Observations and Recommendations of the 
Member States on the 2001 Annual Report of The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
OEA/Ser.G/CP/Doc.3612/02, at 21–22 (May 23, 2002), available at http://scm.oas.org/ 
doc_public/ENGLISH/HIST_02/CP09961E07.DOC. See generally Patricia E. Standaert, The 
Friendly Settlement of Human Rights Abuses in the Americas, 9 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 519 (1999) 
(providing an explanation of the “friendly settlement” mechanism).
241 Participating in the deliberations were the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Defense, Pro-
motion of Women and Human Development, as well as the People’s Ombudsman, the Pe-
ruvian Episcopal Conference, the Peruvian Evangelist Association, and the National Hu-
man Rights Coordinating Committee. See 1 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth 
& Reconciliation Commission], supra note 162, at 22, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ 
ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20I/INTRODUCCION.pdf. 
242 Id. at 23 (“[T]anto los hechos imputables a agentes del Estado, a las personas que actuaron 
bajo su consentimiento, aquiescencia o complicidad, así como los imputables a los grupos sub-
versives.”) (author’s translation). The crimes to be investigated included: (a) murder and abduc-
tion; (b) forced disappearance; (c) torture and other severe injuries; (d) violation of collective 
rights of Andean Communities and Communities native to the country; and (e) other crimes 
and severe violations of the rights of persons. 1 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth 
& Reconciliation Commission], supra note 162, at 195, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/
ifinal (follow “Capítulo 4: La dimensión jurídica de los hechos” hyperlink under “Tomo I”). 
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5.1 Where the international meets the national
Recalling the failed attempt to defeat amnesty laws in South Africa, John 
Dugard points out that where national legal remedies proved inadequate, hu-
man rights advocates in South Africa did not have recourse to international legal 
bodies in the way their counterparts in Latin America did as a result of those 
countries’ membership in the Inter-American System.243 Indeed, despite the state 
practice in Latin America of implementing amnesties, the Inter-American System 
consistently condemned this trend.244 Before the fall of Fujimori’s regime, the 
IACHR had an opportunity to deliberate on the Barrios Altos case and evidenced 
its consistent condemnation of amnesties. It adopted Report No. 28/00 after Peru 
failed to reach a friendly settlement, recommending that the state
annul any domestic, legislative or any other measure aimed at pre-
venting the investigation, prosecution and punishment of those re-
sponsible for the assassinations and injuries resulting from the events 
known as the “Barrios Altos” operation. To this end, the State of Peru 
should abrogate Amnesty Laws Nos. 26,479 and 26,492.245
It further recommended that the state
conduct a serious, impartial and effective investigation into the 
facts, in order to identify those responsible for the assassinations 
and injuries in this case, and continue with the judicial prosecu-
tion of Julio Salazar Monroe, Santiago Martín Rivas, Nelson Car-
bajal García, Juan Sosa Saavedra and Hugo Coral Goycochea, and 
punish those responsible for these grave crimes, through the cor-
responding criminal procedure, in accordance with the law.246 
Peru, however, refused to follow the recommendations and explained in 
a communication on May 9, 2000, that the amnesty laws were exceptional me-
asures in response to terrorist violence, relying on the Peruvian Constitutional 
Court’s ruling.247 With no other recourse, the IACHR decided to submit the case 
to the IACtHR on May 10, 2000, despite Peru’s alleged withdrawal from the 
Court’s contentious jurisdiction.248 In response to the Court’s proceedings, repre-
243 See Dugard, supra note 60, at 282–85.
244 See generally Cassel, supra note 115 (describing the OAS’s reaction to amnesties in Latin 
American countries); Robert Kogod Goldman, Amnesty Laws, International Law and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, 6 Law Group Docket, Summer 1989, at 1; Robert K. Goldman, 
Uruguay: Amnesty Law in Violation of Human Rights Convention, 49 Rev. Int’l Commission Jurists 
37 (1992).
245 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 17 (Mar. 14, 2001) (quoting 
Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru, Cases 11.528, 11.601, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 28/00, 
OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2000)).
246 Id. (quoting Chumbipuma Aguirre et al. v. Peru, Cases 11.528, 11.601, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
Report No. 28/00, OEA/Ser./L/V/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2000)). 
247 Id. ¶ 18. 
248 See id. ¶ 19.
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sentatives of the Peruvian Embassy in Costa Rica communicated with the Court’s 
Secretariat on August 24, 2000, reminding the Court of Peru’s withdrawal.249 
Peru concluded that the immediate effect of this withdrawal upon deposit 
was that the IACtHR no longer had competence to hear an application against 
Peru due to lack of jurisdiction.250 The Court responded by reminding Peru that 
the Court had already rejected the withdrawal in the Ivcher Bronstein and Consti-
tutional Court cases,251 and that in its opinion the “attitude of the State of Peru 
constitutes a clear failure to comply with Article 68(1) of the Convention, and 
also a violation of the basic principle pacta sunt servanda.” 252 The case remained 
in limbo until Fujimori’s regime fell, and Peru reinstated its recognition of the 
Court’s contentious jurisdiction on January 23, 2001. This permitted the Barrios 
Altos case, and others, to go forward. In fact, with the time pressure of the TRC’s 
pending formation, the Peruvian government sought to expedite the case and 
persuaded the Inter-American Commission to press the Court to speed its deci-
sion despite its fears that the IACtHR might depart from the Commission’s own 
evolving jurisprudence against amnesties.253 
5.2 The barrios altos decision
The IACtHR convened a public hearing on March 14, 2001 to hear the 
merits of the Barrios Altos case, during which Peru explained:
[T]he Government’s strategy in the area of human rights is based 
on recognizing responsibilities, but, above all, on proposing in-
tegrated procedures for attending to the victims based on three 
fundamental elements: the right to truth, the right to justice and 
the right to obtain fair reparation. 
[…]
[…] [With regard to the] Barrios Altos case […] substantial mea-
sures have been taken to ensure that criminal justice will make a 
prompt decision on this case. However, we are faced with […] an 
obstacle […] we refer to the amnesty laws. The amnesty laws […] 
directly entailed a violation of the right of all victims to obtain 
not only justice but also truth. . . . Consequently, the Govern-
ment of Peru has suggested to the original petitioners, that is, the 
National Human Rights Coordinator, the possibility of advancing 
with friendly settlements, which entail effective solutions to this 
procedural obstacle […]254
249 Id. ¶ 25. 
250 Id.
251 Id. ¶ 27; see also Ivcher-Bronstein Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54 (Sept. 24, 
1999); Constitutional Court Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 55 (Sept. 24, 1999).
252 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 27 (citations omitted). 
253 See id. ¶ 35. For a fuller account of this history see Laplante, supra note 149, at 222–23. (de-
scribing the Peruvian government’s strategy in approaching the IACtHR).  
254 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 35. 
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Peru, then, set the tone of its transitional justice project to include criminal 
justice. It proposed, among other things, a “preliminary agenda” based on the 
following three points: “identification of mechanisms to fully clarify the facts on 
which the petition was based, including identification of the masterminds and 
perpetrators of the crime, the viability of criminal and administrative punish-
ments for all those found responsible, and specific proposals and agreements on 
matters relating to reparations.”255 
The state, perhaps betraying its own newfound eagerness to annul the pre-
vious government’s “mechanisms of impunity,” suggested “the parties should re-
quest the Inter-American Court to deliver the judgment on the merits immedia-
tely, establishing the international responsibility as determined by the Court and 
taking into account the brief on acquiescence that had been submitted.”256 The 
IACHR, in turn, emphasized that the Court had 
a special opportunity, a truly historic opportunity, to advance inter-
national human rights law, based on measures under domestic law 
that contribute to combat impunity, which is one of the evils of our 
hemisphere, to which this Court and . . . the Commission have ac-
corded fundamental importance. I believe that this attitude of the 
Government of Peru gives us the opportunity to associate ourselves 
with the people of Peru, their Government and their civil society, to 
find creative solutions, which may subsequently be emulated and 
imitated throughout the hemisphere and beyond it.257
The Commission continued by pointing out that the case is “very serious 
and very sad,” because not only did the state act “unlawfully and clandestine-
ly,” but it also deliberately imposed “legislative and judicial mechanisms to pre-
vent the facts [surrounding the gruesome events at Barrios Altos] from being 
known.”258 With the fortuitous change of conditions, the Commission characte-
rized the circumstances as “ripe” for an international pronouncement that would 
provide Peru with an instrument “to destroy and remove the remaining obstacles 
in order to combat impunity in Peru.”259
One could sense the earnest desire of the IACHR to have the Court back 
the Commission’s own growing jurisprudence on the issue, that  did not enjoy the 
same binding effect as decisions of the Court. The gamble paid off, though, and 
that same day the Court issued its judgment stating that the self-amnesty laws 
were invalid.260 The decision came a mere month before Peru’s transitional gover-
nment concluded its negotiations regarding the TRC’s mandate. 
255 Id. 
256 Id.
257 Id. ¶ 36. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
Lisa J. Laplante
98 EJJL                                                                        Chapecó, v. 13, n. 3, p. 59-116, Edição Especial 2012
5.3 The iacthr’s ruling and interpretation
The IACtHR did not have much to deliberate on after the state acquiesced to 
the claims of the petitioners, which meant the Court, pursuant to Article 52(2), only 
needed to decide the acceptability of this admission of responsibility.261 It began with 
the question of whether Peru’s amnesty laws were compatible with the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and concluded with the now frequently cited opinion:
This Court considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on 
prescription and the establishment of measures designed to elimi-
nate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are intended to 
prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for 
serious human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, sum-
mary or arbitrary execution and forced disappearance, all of them 
prohibited because they violate non-derogable rights recognized 
by international human rights law.262
 The Court explained that the amnesty laws prevented survivors and vic-
tims’ families from exercising their right to be heard by a judge, to receive judicial 
protection, and to obtain the investigation, capture, prosecution, and conviction 
of those responsible for the violations, as protected by Articles 8(1), 25, and 
1(1) of the American Convention respectively.263 It further held that those rights 
should be read together with Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention, 
which oblige State Parties to “take all measures to ensure that no one is depri-
ved of judicial protection and the exercise of the right to a simple and effective 
recourse . . . .”264 Furthermore, the Court clarified that the amnesty laws also con-
travene the obligation to adapt internal legislation to international human rights 
obligations, as embodied in Article 2 of the American Convention.265 In this way, 
the Court held that “[s]elf-amnesty laws . . . are manifestly incompatible with the 
aims and spirit of the Convention . . . because [this type of law] obstructs the 
investigation and access to justice and prevents the victims and their next of kin 
from knowing the truth and receiving the corresponding reparation.”266 The laws 
thus “lack legal effect.”267
 The Court turned lastly to the right to truth. The Court agreed with the 
IACHR that the right to truth is based on Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention: 
[T]he right to the truth is subsumed in the right of the victim or his 
next of kin to obtain clarification of the events that violated human 
rights and the corresponding responsibilities from the competent 
261 Id. ¶ 37. 
262 Id. ¶ 41. 
263 Id. ¶ 42. 
264 Id. ¶ 43. 
265 See id. 
266 Id. ¶ 43. 
267 Id. ¶ 44.
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organs of the State, through the investigation and prosecution that 
are established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention.268 
The IACHR had also argued that the right to truth was supported by Arti-
cle 13(1), which provides the right to information, but the Court rested its opi-
nion solely on Articles 8 and 25.269 Arguably, the Court’s ruling contributes to the 
idea that truth and justice are not incompatible, but on the contrary inextricably 
linked. Its decision stands for the proposition that in a transitional justice fra-
mework, prosecutions become another indispensable tool for reaching the truth, 
a task formerly delegated to truth commissions alone.
While the Barrios Altos decision signaled a clear victory for both the tran-
sitional government and the IACHR, it was unclear whether the decision offered 
a general pronouncement or was only specific to the investigation in the Barrios 
Altos case. Several months after the decision, the IACHR, at the request of Peru, 
filed for a clarification of the “meaning and scope” of operative paragraph 4 of 
the Barrios Altos judgment in which the Court declared that “Amnesty Laws No. 
26479 and No. 26492 are incompatible with the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights and, consequently, lack legal effect.”270 The resulting interpretation 
confirmed that “the effects of the decision in the judgment on the merits of the 
Barrios Altos Cases are general in nature.”271 The Court issued its judgment on 
September 3, 2001, just days before the TRC was scheduled to open its doors for 
operation, thus providing the TRC a green light not only to initiate its own in-
vestigations, but also to collaborate with the Attorney General’s office in bringing 
charges against specific perpetrators.272 
6 Interpreting barrios altos: a bar to amnesty for human rights 
violations 
 
Curiously, despite its potentially sweeping effect on the legitimacy of am-
nesties in political transitions, the IACtHR’s Barrios Altos decision has thus far 
268 Id. ¶¶ 45–48. 
269 Id.
270 Barrios Altos Case, Interpretation of the Judgment of the Merits, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 83, ¶¶ 8, 16 (Sept. 3, 2001). 
271 Id. ¶ 18. The IACHR, in its arguments on the matter, rightly pointed out that the Court 
already made this clear in paragraph 44 of its decision on the merits. Id. ¶ 14. There, the Court 
had pronounced: “Owing to the manifest incompatibility of self-amnesty laws and the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the said laws lack legal effect and may not continue to obstruct 
the investigation of the grounds on which this case is based or the identification and punish-
ment of those responsible, nor can they have the same or a similar impact with regard to other 
cases that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the American Convention have 
been violated.” Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 44. The request for 
clarification may thus seem odd, except it could be understood as a desire to preempt any future 
debate on the matter. Arguably, it also permitted the Court to suggest that any amnesty law 
would be found incompatible, as is discussed in this Section. 
272 In its final report, the TRC acknowledged the important precedent established by the Court. 
See Hatun Willakuy, Versión Abreviada del Informe Final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Rec-
onciliación [Summary version of the Final Report of the Truth & Reconciliation Commission] 
31–32 (2003) (Peru). 
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received scant attention from academics, whether from the field of transitional 
justice or international criminal law. This Part describes the ways in which the 
Barrios Altos decision has so far been narrowly interpreted and responds with a 
counteranalysis, including an examination of subsequent IACtHR decisions, whi-
ch suggests a much broader reading of this landmark decision. In particular, this 
Part argues that Barrios Altos: (1) applies to all amnesties and not just self-amnes-
ties; (2) requires that criminal investigations not be substituted for other types of 
noncriminal investigations; and (3) applies to all serious human rights violations 
and not only crimes against humanity. 
6.1 Not limited only to self-amnesty laws
One reason for the narrow reading of the Barrios Altos decision may relate to 
the possible interpretation of the holding as applying only to “self-amnesties.”273 A 
strict reading of the word “self” would imply that the Court’s ruling applies only 
to those laws adopted by the same government seeking immunity from criminal 
prosecution. This narrow interpretation would mean that amnesties promulgated 
by subsequent governments, especially if part of an internal peace negotiation process 
or transitional justice scheme, would be permissible. In addition, it would support 
the restorative justice view of the truth v. justice debate, which argues that alterna-
tive investigatory methods such as truth commissions fulfill the state’s obligation 
to “ensure” a victim’s human right to justice. Scharf adopted this position in 1996, 
prior to the 2001 Barrios Altos decision, but nevertheless set the distinction between 
“self” and all other amnesties that would later be applied to Barrios Altos.274 
A close reading of both the Judgment on the Merits and the subsequent 
Interpretation of the Judgment, however, suggests a much broader interpretation 
that prohibits all amnesties, not just self-amnesties. This broader interpretation 
can be reached by reading the majority opinion together with the concurring 
opinions of both Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, former president of the Court, 
and Judge Sergio García Ramírez, the Court’s current president. Judge Cançado 
Trindade, in a concurring opinion longer than the majority’s, elaborates his view 
that the Barrios Altos case represents 
273 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶¶ 42–44 (emphasis added). While the 
court does not consistently use this term, it does appear in selected paragraphs in its decision 
on the merits. See, e.g., id. For a discussion of the different types of amnesties, see Young, supra 
note 4, at 216 (explaining that the three types include “self amnesty, amnesties granted to end 
political or military conflict, and amnesty in exchange for facts and information surrounding 
specific crimes”). 
274 See Scharf, supra note 105, at 61. (“[I]t is likely that the . . . Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights would . . . agree that measures short of prosecution . . . would be adequate to discharge 
the duty to ensure human rights.”). Scharf repeated this argument in 2006, yet did not mention 
Barrios Altos or the subsequent rulings of the IACtHR that reinforce the general obligation to 
pursue criminal trials for human rights violations that do not necessarily fall within the strict 
criteria of being a crime found in a treaty. See Scharf, supra note 103, at 358. This limited inter-
pretation is also adopted by Elizabeth Evenson. See Elizabeth M. Evenson, Note, Truth and Justice 
in Sierra Leone: Coordination Between Commission and Court, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 730, 750 n.127 
(2004) (interpreting Barrios Altos as applicable only to “self-amnesty” laws).
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a new and great qualitative step forward in its case-law, to the ef-
fect of seeking to overcome an obstacle which the international 
organs of supervision of human rights have not yet succeeded to 
surpass: the impunity, with the resulting erosion of the confidence 
of the population in public institutions. Moreover, they meet an 
expectation which in our days is truly universal. It may be recalled, 
in this respect, that the main document adopted by the II World 
Conference of Human Rights (1993) urged the States to “abrogate 
legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave vio-
lations of human rights […] and prosecute such violations […]”275
Significantly, Judge Cançado Trindade refers to a bedrock principle of inter-
national law: that domestic laws may not be used to avoid international obliga-
tions.276 He has also consistently written in other dissenting and concurring opi-
nions that international law trumps national domestic law.277 This interpretation 
means that any type of immunity measure, including amnesties, made at any time 
to obstruct human rights prosecutions (which are now considered a state duty due 
to the Velásquez Rodríguez decision) would be invalid.
Admittedly, Judge Cançado Trindade’s concurring opinion in Barrios Altos 
may only be read as his alone. However, the IACtHR adopted this same position 
in its subsequent interpretation of Barrios Altos—an interpretation astutely re-
quested by Peru. In its interpretation, the Court reiterated its position that the ru-
ling on amnesties applies to all criminal cases arising out of Peru’s internal armed 
conflict, not just Barrios Altos. The Court also referred to its case-law: 
[T]he general obligation of the State, established in Article 2 of 
the Convention, includes the adoption of measures to suppress 
laws and practices of any kind that imply a violation of the guar-
antees established in the Convention, and also the adoption of 
laws and the implementation of practices leading to the effective 
observance of the said guarantees.
[…] In international law, customary law establishes that a State 
which has ratified a human rights treaty must introduce the neces-
sary modifications to its domestic law to ensure the proper com-
pliance with the obligations it has assumed. This law is universally 
accepted and is supported by jurisprudence. The American Con-
vention establishes the general obligation of each State Party to 
275 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 4 (Cançado Trindade, J., concur-
ring) (quoting World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 60, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993)) (referring to the criticisms 
of the “ignored amnesties” of the past).
276 Judge Cançado Trindade writes: “[These laws are] in flagrant incompatibility with the norms 
of protection of the International Law of Human Rights, bringing about violations de jure of the 
rights of the human person. The corpus juris of the International Law of Human Rights makes it 
clear that not everything that is lawful in the domestic legal order is so in the international legal 
order, and even more forcefully when superior values (such as truth and justice) are at stake. In 
reality, what came to be called laws of amnesty, and particularly the perverse modality of the so-
called laws of self-amnesty, even if they are considered laws under a given domestic legal order, 
are not so in the ambit of the International Law of Human Rights.” Id. ¶ 6.
277 Id. ¶¶ 7–9.
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adapt its domestic law to the provisions of this Convention, in 
order to guarantee the rights that it embodies. This general ob-
ligation of the State Party implies that the measures of domestic 
law must be effective (the principle of effet utile). This means that 
the State must adopt all measures so that the provisions of the 
Convention are effectively fulfilled in its domestic legal system, 
as Article 2 of the Convention requires. Such measures are only 
effective when the State adjusts its actions to the Convention’s 
rules on protection.278
 
The Court’s subsequent interpretation of its own decision in Barrios Altos 
can be read to extend its ruling to all amnesties, not just self-amnesties. This rea-
ding supports the other concurring opinion in Barrios Altos made by Judge García 
Ramírez who, also adhering to his previous concurring opinions, notes that one 
can distinguish between self-amnesty laws “promulgated by and for those in po-
wer,” and those 
[…] that are the result of a peace process, have a democratic base 
and a reasonable scope, that preclude prosecution of acts or be-
haviors of members of rival factions, but leave open the possibility 
of punishment for the kind of very egregious acts that no faction 
either approves or views as appropriate.279 
 Significantly, he goes on to recognize “the advisability of encouraging ci-
vic harmony through amnesty laws that contribute to re-establishing peace and 
opening new constructive stages in the life of a nation.”280 Nonetheless, he reite-
rates the opinion of the “growing sector of doctrine and also the Inter-American 
Court” that “such forgive and forget provisions ‘cannot be permitted to cover 
up the most severe human rights violations, violations that constitute an utter 
disregard for the dignity of the human being and are repugnant to the conscience 
of humanity.’”281 Judge García Ramírez also refers to the principle embodied in 
Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention that states may not “invoke ‘difficulties of a 
domestic nature’ to waive the obligation to investigate the facts that infringed the 
Convention and punish those who are found criminally responsible for them.”282
If there is any question as to the actual reach of the Barrios Altos decision, 
subsequent IACtHR rulings confirm the broader interpretation. For example, the 
Bulacio case reinforces the notion that domestic laws preventing prosecution of 
human rights violations, including amnesty laws, are barred.283 In Bulacio, Argen-
278 Barrios Altos Case, Interpretation of the Judgment on the Merits, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 17 (Sept. 3, 2001) (citations omitted).
279 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 10 (García Ramírez, J., concurring).
280 Id. ¶ 11.
281 Id. 
282 Id. ¶ 12.
283 Bulacio Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100 (Sept. 18, 2004). This case involved 
a complaint brought against the state of Argentina for the death of a seventeen-year-old boy who 
was detained during a general roundup of adolescents before a rock concert and later beaten up 
by police. Id. ¶ 3. See generally Basch, supra note 115, at 207–16 (discussing Bulacio and its impli-
cations for the duty to prosecute doctrine).
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tina acknowledged responsibility for the death of a minor and accepted that it had 
violated the right to life and humane treatment.284 Argentina also accepted res-
ponsibility for violating Articles 8 and 25 by failing to provide an effective remedy 
in the form of a prompt investigation and punishment of those responsible.285 
The IACtHR was left with the task of determining the appropriate reparations, 
including the duty to investigate the human rights violation.286 
The IACtHR determined that the failure to investigate the case in Argen-
tina had “been tolerated and allowed by the intervening judiciary bodies,” which 
acted as though their function was limited only to assuring due process in the 
form of a guaranteed defense at a trial.287 In the domestic case, the defense coun-
sel was allowed to use delaying tactics which stalled the trial for several years and 
ultimately gave rise to a plea for extinguishment of the criminal case.288 Relying 
on the Barrios Altos interpretation, the Court also held: 
[E]xtinguishment provisions or any other domestic legal obstacle 
that attempts to impede the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for human rights violations are inadmissible. The Court 
deems that the general obligations enshrined in Articles 1(1) and 2 of 
the American Convention require that the States Party adopt timely 
provisions of all types for no one to be denied the right to judicial 
protection, enshrined in Article 25 of the American Convention.289
 The Court reiterated that Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties prohibits domestic legal rules, such as extinguishment pro-
visions, from hindering the full application of decisions by international human 
rights bodies.290 According to the Court: “If that were not the case, the rights 
enshrined in the American Convention would be devoid of effective protection. 
This understanding of the Court is in accordance with the language and the spirit 
of the Convention, as well as the general principles of law.” 291 The Court further 
explained that “a situation of grave impunity” existed in Argentina due to the fact 
that no one there had yet been convicted, despite the initiation of judicial proce-
edings nearly twelve years earlier.292 The Court characterized “impunity” as
[…] the overall lack of investigation, pursuit, capture, trial and 
conviction of those responsible for violations of rights protected 
284 See Bulacio, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶¶ 25, 33. 
285 See id. ¶ 33. For instance, the case against one police officer was delayed for several years largely 
due to the fact that “defense counsel for the accused filed a large number of diverse legal questions 
and remedies (requests for postponement, challenges, incidental pleas, objections, motions on lack 
of jurisdiction, requests for annulment, among others), which have not allowed the proceedings to 
progress toward their natural culmination, which has given rise to a plea for extinguishment of the 
criminal action.” Bulacio, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 113.
286 See id. ¶¶ 34, 110.
287 Id. ¶ 114.
288 Id. ¶ 113.
289 Id. ¶ 116 (citations omitted).
290 Id. ¶ 118. For a general discussion of the domestic law prohibition, see Henrard, supra note 78. 
291 Bulacio, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 117 (citation omitted). 
292 Id. ¶ 119.
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under the American Convention, as the State has the obligation to 
combat said situation by all legal means within its power, as impu-
nity fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations and total 
defenselessness of the victims and of their next of kin.293 
 The Court reaffirmed its view that domestic immunity measures such as am-
nesty would impede the state’s duty to investigate and punish perpetrators of hu-
man rights violations in Moiwana Community v. Suriname in 2005.294 There, the Court 
emphasized that Suriname’s amnesty laws would deprive its people of the effective 
protections of the American Convention and ordered the laws to be repealed. 295
The Court reiterated the “domestic law” prohibition against amnesties 
again in the La Cantuta decision in 2006. In that decision, the IACtHR said the 
Article 2 provision, which prohibits domestic laws from being used to avoid in-
ternational legal obligations, “is universally valid and has been characterized in 
case law as an evident principle.”296 As a result, states must adjust their internal 
domestic laws to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Convention, and these 
laws must be effective pursuant to the effet utile principle.297 While the Court in 
La Cantuta did not identify specific domestic measures that may require adjust-
ment, it did offer two general measures which should be adopted: “(i) repealing 
rules and practices of any nature involving violations to the guarantees provided 
for in the Convention or disregarding the rights enshrined therein or hamper the 
exercise of such rights, and (ii) issuing rules and developing practices aimed at 
effectively observing said guarantees.”298 Thus, these general guidelines, if applied 
to the case of amnesty laws would require their being repealed.
6.2 Other investigations cannot substitute for criminal 
investigations
A narrow reading of the Barrios Altos decision might interpret it to apply 
only to blanket amnesties that prohibit all forms of investigation.299 Trumbull 
argues the Court may have left open the possibility that a state could satisfy its 
general obligation to afford accountability so long as it conducted some type of 
investigation, even if not pursuant to a criminal prosecution.300 He also indicates 
in a footnote that Peru did eventually conduct investigations through the TRC in 
293 Id. ¶ 120 (citation omitted).
294 Moiwana Community Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 167 (June 15, 2005).
295 See id. ¶ 207.
296 La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 170 (Nov. 29, 2006) (citation 
omitted).
297 Id. ¶ 171 (citations omitted).
298 Id. ¶ 172 (citations omitted).
299 Trumbull, supra note 43, at 300–01 (suggesting that blanket amnesties that bar all investiga-
tions are not lawful and that states must provide some form of accountability for human rights 
atrocities).
300 Id.; see also Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Activities 
from Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 651, 657 (2003) (suggesting that 
the Court’s holding may be interpreted to mean some form of investigation is necessary).
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the absence of criminal prosecutions, and implies that the IACtHR approved of 
this arrangement, supporting his view. 301
Trumbull’s interpretation may be refuted, though, by subsequent decisions 
of the IACtHR. For example, the Court reiterated the general prohibition on am-
nesties in Cantoral-Huamaní and García-Santa Cruz in 2007, four years after the 
TRC published its final report in 2003. In its decision the Court wrote:
The Court recalls that, when complying with its obligation to in-
vestigate and, if applicable, punish those responsible for the facts, 
the State must remove all the de facto and de jure obstacles, that 
impede the proper investigation of the events, and use all available 
means to expedite the investigation and the respective proceed-
ings in order to avoid a repetition of such serious acts as those 
examined in the instant case. The State may not invoke any law 
or provision of domestic law to exempt itself from the obligation 
to investigate and, if applicable, punish those responsible for the 
acts against Saúl Cantoral-Huamaní and Consuelo García-Santa 
Cruz. In particular, the Court recalls that the State may not apply 
amnesty laws, or provisions relating to prescription, or other provi-
sions that exclude responsibility, which prevent the investigation 
and punishment of those responsible.302 
Significantly, in the La Cantuta decision in 2006, the IACtHR reinforced 
the state’s duty to investigate and conduct criminal trials despite the fact that the 
Peruvian TRC had thoroughly investigated that case.303 The Court thus does not 
accept the proposition that a truth commission investigation alone would satisfy 
the state’s duty to investigate human rights crimes.
6.3 No amnesties for serious human rights violations
 
Currently, there are two categories of international crimes that have become 
accepted bars to amnesties: enumerated treaty crimes, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.304 The Barrios Altos decision, reflecting an already expanding legal 
framework, suggests a third possible bar to amnesties for crimes that arise out of 
human rights violations, but which do not necessarily rise to the level of crimes 
against humanity or war crimes. In this way, a serious violation that did not occur 
during war and that was not part of a general and systematic pattern of human 
rights abuses would still trigger a state duty to prosecute, and thus bar immunity 
measures such as amnesties.305
301 Trumbull, supra note 43, at 301 n.96 (quoting Wilson & Perlin, supra note 300, at 658–59). 
302 Cantoral-Huamaní & García-Santa Cruz Case, 2008 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 167, ¶ 
190 (July 10, 2007).
303 La Cantuta, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 157.
304 See discussion supra notes 144–46.
305 Crimes against humanity are, in essence, human rights violations that are part of a “system-
atic and widespread” policy. For a discussion of how crimes against humanity are in fact human 
rights violations that rise to the level of systematic and widespread, see Tittemore, supra note 
107, at 470.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Cançado Trindade also raised this issue, 
insisting that states have an international obligation to protect universally recog-
nized, nonderogable rights such as the right to life and personal integrity.306 He 
argued these rights are protected by the American Convention and “fall in the 
ambit of jus cogens.”307 He went so far as to say that the adoption and application 
of amnesty laws is “an international illicit act” because those laws constitute a 
breach of a state’s responsibilities under the international law of human rights.308 
He put it plainly: “It ought to be stated and restated firmly, whenever necessary: 
in the domain of the International Law of Human Rights, the so-called ‘laws’ of 
self-amnesty are not truly laws: they are nothing but an aberration, an inadmissi-
ble affront to the juridical conscience of humanity.”309
 Judge Cançado Trindade offers a novel argument on how to identify the 
list of crimes to which amnesty should not apply. He gives an historical account of 
the development and codification of humanitarian law, from the Martens Clause 
to the Geneva Conventions.310 He contends that “however advanced the codifica-
tion of the humanitarian norms might be, such codification can hardly be consi-
dered as truly complete,” and goes on to state: 
The Martens clause […] continues to serve as a warning against 
the assumption that whatever is not expressly prohibited by the 
Conventions on International Humanitarian Law could be per-
mitted; quite on the contrary, the Martens clause sustains the con-
tinuing applicability of the principles of the law of nations (droit 
des gens), the laws of humanity and the dictates (exigencies) of public 
conscience […]311 
In other words, he directly challenges the idea that only those crimes ex-
plicitly codified in international law constitute absolute obligations of states, and 
thus cannot be subject to amnesty.
 Judge García Ramírez, with perhaps more prosaic writing, also supported 
the perspective of his co-justice: 
The principle, in international human rights law and in the most 
recent expressions of international criminal law, that the impu-
nity of conduct that most gravely violates the essential legal rights 
protected by both forms of international law is inadmissible, is 
based on this reasoning. The codification of such conduct and 
the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators—and other 
participants—is an obligation of the State, one that cannot be 
306 Barrios Altos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 10 (Mar. 14, 2001) (Trindade, 
J., concurring). For a discussion of nonderogable rights, see Henrard, supra note 78, at 613–16. 
For comments on the obligation to prosecute for human rights violations, see Carla Edelenbos, 
Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 Leiden J. Int’l L. 5, 14 (1994).
307 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 10 (Cançado Trindade, J., concurring).
308 Id. ¶ 11.
309 Id. ¶ 26.
310 Judge Cançado Trindade discusses the Martens Clause introduced at the I Peace Conference of 
the Hague in 1899, which influenced the later Geneva Conventions. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.
311 Id. ¶¶ 23–24.
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avoided by measures such as amnesty, prescription, admitting 
considerations that exclude incrimination, and others that could 
lead to the same results and establish the impunity of acts that 
gravely violate those primordial legal rights. Thus, extrajudicial ex-
ecutions, the forced disappearance of persons, genocide, torture, 
specific crimes against humanity and certain very serious human rights 
violations must be punished surely and effectively at the national 
and the international level.312
 In sum, these concurring judges propose that human rights violations do 
not need to be systematic and widespread (and thus crimes against humanity) 
before amnesties that would interfere with a state’s obligation to investigate, pro-
secute, and punish those violations will be prohibited.
 Subsequent IACtHR decisions have continued to refine and build the 
jurisprudence on amnesties. These decisions reinforce the interpretation of Barrios 
Altos as barring amnesties for serious human rights violations.313 For example, in 
Bulacio the Court does not rely on the argument that the violation occurred as 
part of a systematic and generalized pattern, and is thus a crime against huma-
nity.314 Significantly, the Court frames the duty to investigate, prosecute, and pu-
nish as part of reparations, and invokes criminal justice as part of the general right 
to know the truth—a right belonging as much to the individual petitioners as to 
Argentine society as a whole. In this way, it folds criminal justice into the idea of 
restorative justice.315 This interpretation has also been extended by human rights 
lawyer Brian D. Tittemore, a former staff member in the General Secretariat of 
the OAS Secretariat for the IACHR, who writes that “the practice and jurispru-
dence of the inter-American human rights system has given rise to and reinforced 
international legal principles and standards governing the obligation of states to 
ensure individual accountability for serious human rights violations, including 
those infringements that would constitute crimes under international law.”316 
312 Barrios Altos, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, ¶ 13 (García Ramírez, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added).
313 For example, in Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, the Court specifically addressed the issue of the 
prohibition of amnesties for crimes against humanity. Instead of merely referring to the Barrios 
Altos decision, the Court made a special reading as if to expand the doctrine to extend to crimes 
against humanities as an obvious extension of human rights violations, since in reality they 
run along a continuum. Almonacid-Arellano Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, 
¶ 114 (Sept. 26, 2006) (“States cannot neglect their duty to investigate, identify, and punish 
those persons responsible for crimes against humanity by enforcing amnesty laws or any other 
similar domestic provisions. Consequently, crimes against humanity are crimes which cannot be 
susceptible of amnesty.”). 
314 One expert witness described the policy of “razzias” (the vernacular term for the police 
roundups) as “a more or less systematic policy,” but the Court nowhere else in the opinion made 
reference to the term “systematic.” Bulacio Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 
53 (Sept. 18, 2003). 
315 See id. ¶¶ 110, 112 (citations omitted).
316 Tittemore, supra note 107, at 449. Significantly, Tittemore includes the category of “serious 
human rights violations” on the list of crimes over which international tribunals (including the 
ICC and the tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) have jurisdiction. 
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7 State practice: reinforcing the international legal ban to 
amnesties in domestic courts
This final Part explores how subsequent state practice in Latin America 
may offer additional persuasion as to the broad reach of the Barrios Altos decision. 
In response to Barrios Altos, many states have annulled their amnesty laws and 
initiated criminal trials. This is significant, for one, because patterns of state prac-
tice ultimately form the basis of customary international law. This phenomenon 
also supports this Article’s argument that Barrios Altos should be read broadly to 
prohibit all forms of amnesty for human rights violations. 
The decisions of domestic courts in Latin America offer persuasive evidence 
for the broad interpretation of the Barrios Altos case. International law arises not 
only out of the decisions of international organs, but also the application of tho-
se decisions in domestic legal systems.317 Thus, “[o]ne measure of the impact of 
international law principles, but the most difficult to trace and document, is pre-
cisely how well they effectuate this indirect transfer into the national sphere.”318 
Others recognize the importance of observing state practice in order to begin car-
ving out universal norms. Dugard writes that “it is difficult to identify mandatory 
rules of international law to govern the conduct of the successor regime. The best 
one can do is to identify trends that probably qualify as emergent norms. These 
norms appear from recent state practice.”319 
 Those who still adamantly argue that amnesties can only be prohibited 
for treaty crimes point to consistent state practice as evidence of a customary rule 
of international law in this regard.320 Because states still apply amnesty, they ar-
gue, it must be permissible under international law.321 Scharf, a strong proponent 
of this approach, argues, “Notwithstanding the chimerical conclusions of some 
scholars, there is scant evidence that a rule prohibiting amnesty or asylum in cases 
of crimes against humanity has ripened into a compulsory norm of customary 
international law.”322 He explains that when “widespread practice” begins to con-
form to the proclamations of international bodies then, despite a “few instances 
of departure,” this practice can be called binding customary law.323 
317 Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 31, at 844–45. 
318 Id. at 845.
319 Dugard, supra note 60, at 280.
320 See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 103, at 360 (“Customary international law, which is just as bind-
ing upon states as treaty law, arises from ‘a general and consistent practice of states followed by 
them from a sense of legal obligation’ referred to as opinio juris.”). 
321 This camp of scholars disagrees with the argument that these countries may in fact be violat-
ing international law. See Scharf, supra note 105, at 61 (writing that despite some UN General 
Assembly resolutions and forceful arguments by legal scholars, “state practice does not yet sup-
port the existence of an obligation under international law to refrain from conferring amnesty 
for crimes against humanity”). For a list of states that have enacted amnesties following episodes 
of human rights violations, see Trumbull, supra note 43, at 294–97.
322 Scharf, supra note 103, at 360. Scharf makes this argument but omits discussion of the Barrios 
Altos decision in his article. 
323 Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes 
in Haiti?, 31 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 41 (1996); see also Slye, supra note 5, at 175 (citing the increased 
use of amnesties and thus suggesting state practice).
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 Heeding the call to monitor state practice, it is significant that state mem-
bers of the Inter-American System have now begun to annul the same amnesty 
laws which initially established the general state practice that suggested they were 
legally permissible, and they do so relying on the Barrios Altos case. Moreover, 
these states are now pursuing criminal trials against those responsible for human 
rights violations in past regimes. In Peru, for instance, the transitional justice 
experience was dramatically influenced by the Barrios Altos case, as already men-
tioned. On April 20, 2002, the Attorney General’s Office of Peru issued a resolu-
tion to create a special prosecutor as part of its plan to implement the IACtHR’s 
decision.324 Soon after, Peru’s Constitutional Court issued seminal decisions that 
referred to the Barrios Altos decision and served as precedent for all Peruvian 
courts.325 Indeed, in one of these cases, the court corrected its own jurisprudence 
issued six years earlier on the issue of amnesty, framing its arguments within the 
terms of the right to truth.326 Peru’s highest court explained:
[I]t falls to the State to prosecute those responsible for crimes 
against humanity and, where necessary, to adopt restrictive laws 
to prevent, for example statutes of limitation for crimes against 
human rights. The application of such laws is conducive to the 
effectiveness of the legal system and is justified by the prevailing 
interests of the struggle against impunity. The objective, evidently, 
is to impede certain mechanisms in the criminal law system, which 
are applied for the repulsive purpose of securing impunity. This 
must be prevented and avoided, since it encourages criminals to 
repeat their behaviors, becomes a breeding ground for vengeance, 
and corrodes the underlying values of democratic society: truth 
and justice.327
The opinion, in effect, imbues the transitional justice formula promoted 
by the TRC with a new legality.328 With the help of the Inter-American System, 
324 Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación No. 631-2002-MP-FN, Diario Oficial El Peruano No. 
221,668 (Apr. 20, 2002) (Peru). The Attorney General issued a follow-up resolution on April 
20, 2005, ordering prosecutors in all instances working on cases that were subject to the amnes-
ty laws to request the trial or appellate court to enforce the international judgment. Resolución 
de la Fiscalía de la Nación No. 815-2005-MP-FN, El Peruano (Apr. 20, 2005).
325 Martín Rivas, Constitutional Court, Exp. No. 4587-2004-AA/TC (Nov. 29, 2005) (Peru); 
Vera Navarrete, Constitutional Court, Exp. No. 2798-04-HC/TC (Dec. 9, 2004) (Peru); Villegas 
Namuche, Constitutional Court, Exp. No. 2488-2002-HC/TC (Mar. 18 2004) (Peru). 
326 Villegas Namuche, Constitutional Court, Exp. No. 2488-2002-HC/TC, ¶¶ 8–20.
327 Id. ¶ 23 (“Asimismo, corresponde al Estado el enjuiciamiento de los responsables de crímenes 
de lesa humanidad y, si es necesario, la adoptación de normas restrictivas para evitar, por ejem-
plo, la prescripción de los delitos que violenten gravemente los derechos humanos. La aplicación 
de estas normas permite la eficacia del sistema jurídico y se justifica por los intereses prevalentes 
de la lucha contra la impunidad. El objetivo, evidentemente, es impedir que ciertos mecanismos 
del ordenamiento penal se apliquen con el fin repulsivo de lograr la impunidad. Ésta debe ser 
siempre prevenida y evitada, puesto que anima a los criminales a la reiteración de sus conductas, 
sirve de caldo de cultivo a la venganza y corroe dos valores fundantes de la sociedad democráti-
ca: la verdad y la justicia.”) (author’s translation).
328 Significantly, the status of the Barrios Altos decision in national law gained more clarity during 
the proceedings of the La Cantuta case before the IACtHR. While the Commission and repre-
sentatives of the victims argued that the state should take positive steps to annul the amnesty 
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all procedural impediments to pursuing criminal justice as part of the Peruvian 
transitional justice project were eliminated.329 The TRC’s mandate established its 
remit to conduct a two-year investigation into the causes and consequences of 
the armed conflict.330 The Barrios Altos case directly influenced Peru’s decision to 
include the eventual possibility of criminal investigations and prosecutions in the 
TRC’s mandate, even if the TRC itself could not conduct such trials. 
Throughout its two-year investigation, the TRC purposefully conducted its 
operations in a manner that would support state investigations, even creating a spe-
cial criminal investigation unit to prepare cases to present to the state.331 Even befo-
re it presented its final report in August 2003, the TRC held a ceremony to transfer 
for investigation the first case to the Public Ministry to symbolize its commitment 
to criminal prosecutions. The TRC later transferred an additional forty-three of the 
most emblematic cases of human rights violations and recommended prompt cri-
minal investigations and prosecutions in hundreds of others.332 In addition, its final 
report included chapters on the most important cases arising out of the twenty-year 
internal armed conflict, including Barrios Altos333 and La Cantuta.334 Thus, now, 
some five years after the TRC published its final report in 2003, national public 
prosecutors across the country have opened hundreds of criminal investigations 
into alleged extrajudicial killings and disappearances, some of which rose to the le-
vel of massacres and all of which occurred during the country’s twenty-year internal 
armed conflict between state agents and insurgent groups. 
Meanwhile, many of the criminal investigations into the cases arising out 
of the friendly settlement reached between Peru and the IACHR were underway 
as the TRC prepared its final report. The report looked at the incidents at Barrios 
law, the state responded by saying it was not necessary, naming various other measures taken 
by the state. See La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 164 (Nov. 29, 
2006). The state argued that “the granting of amnesty has no practical effects in the domestic 
legal system.” Id. The state, however, added that “in the event the Court held a different view, 
it should state precisely what such measure would be, since this is not a simple issue concerning 
domestic law. Under the current Constitution, not only are human rights treaties part of the 
domestic law, but also any interpretation made by the organs created by such treaties constitute 
mandatory criteria by which the rights in the country are to be interpreted. Therefore, in the 
State’s opinion, such legal framework would be sufficient in the current state of affairs.” Id.
329 See generally Eduardo González Cueva, The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Challenge of Impunity, in Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus 
Justice 70 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006). By contrast, in South Af-
rica, victims could not resort to an international tribunal when they lost their challenge against 
amnesty laws before the highest national court. See Roht-Arriaza & Gibson, supra note 31, at 
856–57 (describing the frustrated attempts of South Afrikaners to contest the amnesty laws). 
330 See 1 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth & Reconciliation Commission], supra 
note 162, at 26, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20I/INTRODUC-
CION.pdf. 
331 See González Cueva, supra note 329, at 78–79.
332 During its investigations, the TRC began to present some of its criminal investigations to the 
Attorney General’s office (author’s personal observations from field work). 
333 7 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliacion [Truth & Reconciliation Commission], supra note 
162, at 475, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustra-
tivos-UIE/2.45%20BARRIOS%20ALTOS.pdf.
334 Id. at 233, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/pdf/TOMO%20VII/Casos%20Ilustra-
tivos-UIE/2.22.%20LA%20CANTUTA.pdf. 
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Altos and La Cantuta as part of a general investigation of Colina. Also, on October 
16, 2001, the Peruvian Military Council responded to the IACtHR ruling in Bar-
rios Altos by declaring “null and void” the Supreme Court judgment issued on June 
16, 1995, which extended amnesty to the army officials charged with the Barrios 
Altos massacre.335 At the same time, the civil courts obtained jurisdiction over 
these cases.336 As a result, some fifty-six persons were indicted, including a milita-
ry general and a top intelligence advisor to Fujimori. Proceedings against Colina 
agents were also reinitiated in the La Cantuta case, running concurrently with the 
TRC and resulting in convictions on April 8, 2008.337 In August 2007, the special 
court for anticorruption, which also handles human rights, opened proceedings 
against persons involved in La Cantuta, including Luis Augusto Pérez Document, 
General Hermosa-Ríos, Montesinos, and José Velarde Astete.338 
 The TRC’s explicit commitment to criminal justice prompted public pro-
secutors in the sixteen provinces most affected by the war to open investigations 
into hundreds of human rights cases.339 For example, a prosecutor in the Andean 
highlands of Ayacucho, where the greatest brunt of political violence occurred, 
initiated investigations and prosecutions in some three hundred cases of human 
rights violations after going into rural communities to interview victims. She na-
med former president Alan García among the suspected perpetrators in the case of 
Accomarca, charging him with genocide (Garcia was president from 1995-1990, 
and was newly elected in 2006). Thus, beginning in 2005, the provincial and cen-
tral criminal courts have issued a handful of significant judgments, some of which 
include substantial prison sentences for military and police officers. Perhaps most 
significantly, top leaders—including Fujimori—have been facing trials for crimes 
arising out of human rights violations. These historical cases are resulting in judi-
cial decisions on human rights law which ultimately contribute both to national 
and international criminal law jurisprudence. 
335 La Cantuta Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 80(63) (Nov. 29, 2006). The 
Peruvian officers included: Brigade Army General Juan Rivero-Lazo, Army Colonel Eliseo Pich-
ilingue-Guevara, Army Captain José Adolfo Velarde-Astete, Army Lieutenant Aquilino Portella-
Núñez, Army Third-Rank Technicians Julio Chuqui-Aguirre, Nelson Rogelio Carbajal-García, 
Jesús Antonio Sosa-Saavedra, and retired Army Lieutenant Aquilino Portella-Núñez. Id. The 
October 16, 2001, ruling allowed the perpetrators to return to the procedural status they held 
before the amnesty laws took effect and allowed the judgment of May 3, 1994, to be served. Id.
336 See Resolución Administrativa No. 170-2004-CE-PJ, Diario Oficial El Peruano (Sept 30, 
2004) (Peru).
337 The former head of SIN, General Julio Salazar-Monroe, was sentenced to thirty-five years 
in prison for his role in the La Cantuta disappearances, and three of his subordinates received 
fifteen-year sentences for the same offenses. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Peru: Sala-
zar Conviction Step on Road to Justice (Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/
docs/2008/04/09/peru18489.htm. 
338 República del Perú [Republic of Peru], Defensoría del Pueblo [Ombudsman], El Estado frente 
a las víctimas de la violencia. ¿Hacia dónde vamos en políticas de reparación y justicia? [The 
State with regard to victims of violence: How far will we go with reparation and justice policy?] 
99 n.31 (2007) (Peru), available at http://www.defensoria.gob.pe/inform-defensoriales.php.
339 Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [National Coordinator of Human Rights], 
Informe Anual 2007 [Annual Report 2007], at 22 (2008) (Peru), available at http://www.dhperu.
org/documentos/informe/85fa9b_cap1.pdf. 
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One of the most important events in this evolving criminal justice movement 
was the successful extradition of Fujimori in September 2007, after six years of pro-
ceedings, first with Japan and then with Chile. Fujimori faces charges of both cor-
ruption and human rights, the latter including the incidents of Barrios Altos and La 
Cantuta. Fujimori’s trial for the human rights charges began on December 10, 2007. 
On April 7, 2009, he was found guilty on all human rights charges and sentenced 
to twenty-five years in prison; Fujimori has declared he will appeal his conviction.340
The Barrios Altos precedent has begun to show its impact in Latin America, 
beyond just Peru where it applied directly. For example, on June 14, 2005, the 
Argentine Supreme Court of Justice found the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws 
were unconstitutional because they violated the country’s international legal obli-
gations.341 Part of the Argentine court’s reasoning rested on the Barrios Altos deci-
sion, which it interpreted as providing a general bar against all amnesties that pre-
vent criminal accountability for serious human rights violations.342 Almost thirty 
years after the amnesty laws halted criminal justice in Argentina, the influence of 
the ruling can be seen as national prosecutors open criminal prosecutions against 
almost three hundred military officers who benefited from earlier amnesty laws.343 
The Court relied on international law, including the IACHR’s decision on 
Argentina’s Full Stop and Full Obedience laws and Barrios Altos, in its decision. 
The Court specifically interpreted these decisions to apply beyond just self-am-
nesty laws, and thus resolved any doubt on the illegality of Argentina’s immunity 
laws.344 In addition, the Court made reference to the IACHR’s general position 
that it is “practically irrelevant” that amnesties are enacted by democratic bodies 
based on the demands of national reconciliation because these laws still violate 
the American Convention and the duty to prosecute as established in the Velás-
quez Rodríquez ruling.345 Significantly, the Argentine justices referred specifically to 
Judge García Ramírez’s concurring judgment in Barrios Altos in which he argued 
the decision should be extended to all amnesties despite their possible beneficial 
effects in reestablishing peace.346 
 One can also see renewed efforts to pursue criminal justice in Chile, es-
pecially in the wake of the Pinochet case which reinvigorated local efforts to as-
sure criminal prosecutions for the human rights violations of that country’s dirty 
war.347 When Pinochet returned to Chile, the Chilean Congress lifted the former 
leader’s parliamentary immunity to allow criminal proceedings to be initiated 
340 Simon Romero, Peru’s Ex-President Convicted of Rights Abuses, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 2009, at A6, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/world/americas/08fujimori.html.
341 Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Julio Héctor Simón,” Colección Oficial de 
Fallos (2005-328-2056) (Arg.), available at http://www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/3560.pdf.
342 Id. ¶ 24. For a discussion on this issue, see Tittemore, supra note 107, at 449–54 (provid-
ing an account of Argentina’s recent judicial decisions on the amnesty laws enacted in its 
political transition). 
343 Canton, supra note 39, at 167.
344 CSJN, 14/6/2005, “Julio Héctor Simón,” Fallos (2005-328-2056), ¶ 25 (Arg.). For a discus-
sion of Argentina’s reliance on Barrios Altos, see Márquez Urtubey, supra note 28, at 122.
345 CSJN, 14/6/2005, “Julio Héctor Simón,” Fallos (2005-328-2056), ¶¶ 25–27 (Arg.). 
346 Id. ¶ 27.
347 See Evans, supra note 33, at 210.
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against him.348 The parliament also presented a bill to annul Chile’s twenty-year-
-old amnesty laws to enable criminal proceedings against other suspected human 
rights violators—the measure was up for a vote at the time of publication.349 In 
addition, the Supreme Court of Chile ruled on the inapplicability of Chile’s am-
nesty laws and statutes of limitations in investigations on forced disappearan-
ces.350 Chile, along with Spain and South Africa, has also renewed efforts to bring 
perpetrators to justice, providing that “despite explicit efforts to leave the past 
behind, the contentious issue of human rights refuses to remain buried.”351 
These renewed campaigns for criminal justice suggest that those who poin-
ted to these same countries as examples “that truth could substitute for justice” 
to argue that state practice supported amnesties, overlooked the resilience of the 
“thirst for justice.”352 Indeed, local victims eventually began to force a sea change 
in state behavior and put into question some of the once accepted tenets of the 
truth v. justice debate through their diligent use of international legal recourse. 
Essentially, the maxim appears today to be truth and then later justice. Justice 
may be delayed but nonetheless the principle of criminal justice remains in the 
equation.353 Moreover, it seems a new stage in the transitional justice field is mo-
ving away from the truth v. justice debate, which poses the options in binary terms 
of choosing between trials or truth commissions (i.e., either/or), and instead ex-
panding to the view that transitional justice encompasses both options (i.e., and/
also). Indeed, Peru’s clear deviance from the truth commission model set in South 
Africa could divert the international trend, making the South African experience 
suddenly an isolated exception.354 
The more current trend is to see countries opting for both truth commis-
sions and criminal prosecutions.355 For example, upon revoking a blanket amnesty 
offered in peace negotiations, Sierra Leone eventually annulled that law and for-
348 Id. 
349 Agenda de Derechos Humanos para el Bicentenario [Human Rights Agenda for the Bicenten-
nial], Comisión del Constitución del Senado Aprueba Derogación de Amnistía [Senate Consti-
tutional Commission Approves Amnesty Derogation] (Dec. 18, 2008), athttp://adhb.wordpress.
com/2008/12/18/comision-del-constitucion-del-senado-aprueba-derogacion-de-amnistia/ (Chile).
350 Miguel Angel Sandoval Rodríguez Case, Corte Suprema de Chile (Nov. 17, 2004), available 
at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/krassnoff.html (referring to Chilean Decree Law No. 
2191 of 1978).
351 Evans, supra note 33, at 208; see also David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative 
Framework, 13 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 43, 53 (1999); Margaret Popkin & Nehal Bhuta, Latin American 
Amnesties in Comparative Perspective: Can the Past be Buried?, 13 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 99, 111 (1999). 
352 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 313.
353 See Marguerite Feitlowitz, A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture 193 
(1998) (discussing Argentina’s “Scilingo Effect” of confessions coming two decades after junta 
rule ended).
354 See Jenkins, supra note 61, at 46 (noting South Africa’s exceptional experience based on the 
exchange of amnesty for confessions); Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: 
Experiments in International Justice, 12 Crim. L.F. 185 (2001) (discussing the experiences of coun-
tries opting for criminal trials).
355 Carsten Stahn, Accommodating Individual Criminal Responsibility and National Reconciliation: The 
UN Truth Commission for East Timor, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 952, 954 (2001) (writing on the develop-
ment of truth commissions into a “justice-supportive machinery”).
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med a Special Court at the same time it created a Truth Commission in 2002.356 
Now, almost two decades after the truth v. justice debate gained momentum, con-
sensus suggests that truth commissions and criminal trials are “mutually reinfor-
cing and complementary,” rather than options which create tensions, tradeoffs, 
and dilemmas. 357
Certainly the new global context, aided by judicial pronouncements like 
Barrios Altos, greatly influences the international community’s attitude towards 
amnesties, which also influences the pressure on national leaders to pursue crimi-
nal justice.358 In this vein, political scientist Elin Skaar found that in thirty Latin 
American and African countries that underwent transition after the mid-1970s, 
the government’s human rights policy rested largely on the “relative strength” of 
the public’s demand for truth and justice balanced with the outgoing regime’s 
demand for amnesty and impunity.359
8 Conclusion
The IACtHR offered the international community a holding in Barrios Altos 
that if read broadly could cause monumental changes in transitional justice sche-
mes. Yet, despite my inclination to refute narrow readings of the Inter-American 
decision, I at the same time must acknowledge one significant factor that could 
nevertheless continue to limit the reach of Barrios Altos. In particular, the steadily 
growing framework of international law has created new dilemmas and concerns 
regarding the lack of uniformity in a system that has no overarching court or legis-
lature to unify laws and practice. Indeed, the IACtHR is a regional tribunal, whose 
holding technically is only binding on OAS members, and then only to those who 
have signed the American Convention. 
Thus, we are left with the question whether the Barrios Altos precedent sig-
nifies a new evolution in the general field of international law for all countries, or 
alternatively only for the region of Latin America. Is it a watershed in combating 
international impunity, or just one more example of the type of fragmentation in 
international criminal law that Gerhard Hafner views as the “erratic blocks and 
elements” of an “‘unorganized system’ full of intra-systematic tensions, contra-
dictions and frictions”?360 It will be important to watch whether the Barrios Altos 
decision begins to serve as persuasive authority in other regions and settings in 
order to assess its full impact.
356 See Schabas, supra note 99, at 157–61. The Special Court went on further to test the valid-
ity of the amnesty laws finding that a state may not create amnesties to protect offenders from 
prosecution for crimes that amount to an international crime subject to international jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 161.
357 Leebaw, supra note 40, at 103.
358 See generally Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Special Problems of a Duty to Prosecute: Derogation, Amnesties, 
Statutes of Limitation, and Superior Orders, in Impunity and Human Rights in International Law 
and Practice, supra note 25, at 57. 
359 Elin Skaar, Truth Commissions, Trials—or Nothing? Policy Options in Democratic Transitions, 20 
Third World. Q. 1109, 1124 (1999).
360 Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l 
L. 849, 850 (2004).
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Regardless of its reach, the implications of the outlawing of amnesties in 
transitional justice settings, even if contained in Latin America, generate new 
questions in the field. One recent line of inquiry looks at how international cri-
minal law is being “nationalized” and again how this creates issues of “fragmenta-
tion” in terms of the substance and application of international legal norms. For 
instance, in holding human rights trials while respecting the principles of legality, 
which law do states apply? In the case of Peru, which only recently codified ex-
trajudicial execution close to the end of Fujimori’s regime in 1998, it is applying 
common criminal codes of homicide. How does this choice of law contribute or 
undermine the developing norms of international criminal law, or does it even 
matter? Will evolving state practice and jurisprudence result in difficult contra-
dictions and inconsistencies, or will it slowly evolve into a uniform system? 
Finally, if the trend points toward inclusion of national criminal trials in 
transitional justice settings, what will be the implications for the now broader 
goals of these schemes in terms of restorative justice? Will national reconciliation 
be undermined? Will national trials perhaps be compromised by inexperienced, 
weak, or corrupt courts, and will political realities only increase victim-survivors’ 
distrust and disappointment? Or alternatively, will a new legality inspire more 
creative ways of upholding the principle of criminal justice while carving out ex-
ceptions such as plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion? 
These are only a few of the questions that arise when contemplating a 
new phase in the development of transitional justice. While the binary nature 
of the truth v. justice debate perhaps simplified the conversation by providing two 
options, we now enter a more complex and nuanced territory that may test the 
social and political limits of a new legality that limits the possibility of choice.
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